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Abstract
The logic of Conditional Beliefs (CDL) has been introduced by Board, Baltag and
Smets to reason about knowledge and revisable beliefs in a multi-agent setting.
In this paper both the semantics and the proof theory for this logic are studied.
First, a natural semantics for CDL is defined in terms of neighbourhood models,
a multi-agent generalisation of Lewis’ spheres models, and it is shown that the
axiomatization of CDL is sound and complete with respect to this semantics. Second,
it is shown that the neighbourhood semantics is equivalent to the original one defined
in terms of plausibility models, by means of a direct correspondence between the
two types of models. On the basis of neighbourhood semantics, a labelled sequent
calculus for CDL is obtained. The calculus has strong proof-theoretic properties, in
particular admissibility of contraction and cut, and it provides a decision procedure
for the logic. Furthermore, its semantic completeness is used to obtain a constructive
proof of the finite model property of the logic. Finally, it is shown that other doxastic
operators can be easily captured within neighbourhood semantics. This fact provides
further evidence of the naturalness of the neighbourhood semantics for the analysis
of epistemic/doxastic notions.1
1 Introduction
Modal epistemic logic has been studied for a long time in formal epistemology, computer
science, and notably in artificial intelligence. In this logic, to each agent i is associated
a knowledge modality Ki, so that the formula KiA expresses that “agent i knows A.”
Through agent-indexed modal operators, epistemic logic can be used to reason about
the mutual knowledge of a set of agents. The logic has been further extended by other
modalities to encode various types of combined knowledge of agents (e.g. common
knowledge). However, knowledge is not the only propositional attitude, and belief is
equally significant to reason about epistemic interaction among agents. Board (2004),
and then Baltag and Smets (2006; 2008; 2008bis), have proposed a logic called CDL
1This work is a substantial extension of the article by the same authors The logic of conditional belief:
neighbourhood semantics and sequent calculus in L. Beklemishev, S. Demri and A. Ma´te´ Editors, AIML
2016, vol. 11, pp 322-341.
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(Conditional Doxastic Logic) for modelling both belief and knowledge in a multi-agent
setting. The essential feature of beliefs is that they are revisable whenever the agent
learns new information. To capture the revisable nature of beliefs, CDL contains the
conditional belief operator Beli(C|B), the meaning of which is that agent i would believe
C in case she learnt B. Thus, the connective is employed to represent how an agent would
react in response to an hypothetical situation: if the agent were to learn B, she would
believe that C held in the state of the world before the act of learning B. For this reason
Baltag and Smets qualify this logic as “static” in contrast to “dynamic” epistemic logic,
where the very act of learning (by some form of announcement) may change the agent’s
beliefs. The logic CDL in itself is used as the basic formalism to study further dynamic
extensions of epistemic logics, determined by several kinds of epistemic/doxastic actions.
The logic of conditional belief has also been significantly employed in game theory
(Stalnaker, 1998). This logic is suitable to describe game models, i.e. idealized static
models which represent games. In this setting, the operators of simple belief and knowl-
edge account for a player’s doxastic and epistemic attitudes, whereas the conditional
belief operator is employed to represent the choices a player maintains as possible at
a certain stage, i.e. the strategies a player would apply in response to other player’s
choices.
More generally, the conditional belief operator is suited to represent the states of
belief an agent would form in response to an hypothetical situation; thus, CDL is able to
give a complete representation of an agent’s epistemic and doxastic attitudes at a given
moment of time. Notice that both unconditional beliefs and knowledge can be defined in
CDL: BeliB (agent i believes B) as Beli(B|>), KiB (agent i knows B) as Beli(⊥|¬B),
the latter meaning that i considers impossible (inconsistent) to learn ¬B. In order to
illustrate the difference between the conditional belief operator Beli(B|A) and the simple
belief operator Beli(A ⊃ B), consider the following (modified) example from Stalnaker
(1998). Let agent i have the belief that Jones is a coward, formalized as BeliC(j). Now,
we want to express the fact that if the agent is to learn that Jones has been sent to
battle, he would no longer believe that he is a coward (since only brave men are sent
to battle). If we expressed this fact with the simple belief operator we would end up in
a contradiction, because from ¬Beli(S(j) ⊃ C(j)) we conclude ¬BeliC(j). However, if
we express it as ¬Beli(C(j)|S(j)), we do not end up in contradiction, since ¬BeliC(j)
cannot be derived (this can be verified using either the axiom system in Subsection 2.1
or the sequent calculus in Section 3).
The axiomatization of the operator Beli in CDL internalises the well-known AGM
postulates of belief revision2. This is something we include, without modification, in our
treatment. However, differently from what has been previously done in the literature,
we provide a semantics for CDL based on neighbourhood models. These models are often
used in the interpretation of non-normal modal logics; in the present setting they can
be seen as a multi-agent generalization of Lewis’ sphere models for counterfactual logics.
In these models to each world x and agent i is associated a set Ii(x) of nested sets of
2We cannot mention here the vast literature on the relation between belief revision, conditional logics,
the Ramsey Test, and Ga¨rdenfors Triviality Result.
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worlds; each set α ∈ Ii(x) represents, so to say, a relevant piece of information that can
be used to establish the truth of an epistemic/doxastic statement. We provide a direct
completeness proof of the axiomatization for CDL with respect to our semantics.
In the literature the semantic interpretation of CDL is usually defined in terms of
epistemic plausibility models, where to each agent i is associated an equivalence relation
∼i and a well-founded pre-orderi on worlds. The former relation models knowledge and
is used to interpret epistemic indistinguishability of states, whereas the latter relation
models conditional belief. To this aim, the relation assesses the relative plausibility of
worlds according to an agent i; then, it holds that gent i believes B conditionally on A
in a world x if B holds in the most plausible worlds accessible from x in which A holds,
the “most plausible worlds” for an agent i being the i-minimal ones. This semantic
approach has been dominant in the studies of CDL; in addition to Board (2004) and
Baltag and Smets (2008), we mention works by Pacuit (2013), van Ditmarsch et al.
(2008) and Demey (2011).
We prove that the semantics defined in terms of neighbourhood models is equivalent
to the one defined with epistemic plausibility models. This result does not come as totally
unexpected: for the mono-agent case, it was suggested by Board (2004), Pacuit (2013)
and Marti et al. (2013), based on an old result about the correspondence between partial
orders and Alexandroff topologies (Alexandroff, 1937). We detail the correspondence for
the multi-agent case. We argue that neighbourhood models provide by themselves a terse
interpretation of the epistemic and doxastic modalities, abstracting away the relational
information specified in plausibility models. Moreover, it is worth noticing that in these
models the interpretation of unconditional beliefs and knowledge results in the standard
universal/existential neighbourhood modalities.
Up to this moment, the logic CDL has been studied only from a semantic point of
view, and no proof system or calculus has been given. Our main goal is to provide
one. On the basis of neighbourhood semantics we develop a labelled sequent calculus,
called G3CDL, following the general methodology of Negri (2005) to develop labelled
calculi for modal logics. Similarly to Negri and Olivetti (2015), the calculus G3CDL
makes use of world and neighbourhood labels, thereby importing the semantics, limited
to the essential, into the syntax. In G3CDL, each connective is handled by symmetric
left/right rules, whereas the properties of neighbourhood models are handled by ad-
ditional rules independent of the language of CDL. The resulting calculus is analytic
and enjoys strong proof-theoretical properties, the most important being admissibility
of cut and contraction, which we prove syntactically. We show that the adoption of a
standard strategy for the calculus G3CDL provides a decision procedure for CDL. We
also prove the semantic completeness of the calculus: it is possible to extract from a
failed derivation a finite countermodel of the initial formula. This result combined with
the soundness of the calculus yields a constructive proof of the finite model property of
CDL.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the logic CDL, an axiom-
atization, and neighbourhood models for it. In Section 3 we give the rules of sequent
calculus G3CDL, and in Section 4 we provide proofs of soundness, termination and
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completeness. Section 5 contains the proof of equivalence between preferential models
and neighbourhood models for CDL. Finally, in the last section we take into account
other belief operators studied in the literature, such as strong and safe belief (Baltag and
Smets, 2008), and we extend the neighbourhood models interpretation and the sequent
calculus to cover these cases. The fact that we can easily accommodate these further
operators in neighbourhood semantics gives additional evidence of the naturalness of
this semantics in the analysis of epistemic and doxastic notions.
2 The logic of conditional beliefs
We recall an axiomatization for the logic of conditional beliefs and present a new seman-
tics, given in terms of neighbourhood models, for this logic. We then prove soundness
and completeness of the axiomatization with respect to this class of models.
In the literature, the semantics of CDL is usually defined in terms of epistemic
plausibility models. A presentation of these models and a proof of equivalence between
plausibility and neighbourhood models will be shown in Section 5.
2.1 Axiomatization
The language of CDL is defined from a denumerable set of atoms Atm by means of
propositional connectives and the conditional operator Beli , where the index i ranges
over a set of agents A. In the following, P denotes an atomic formula and i an agent.
The formulas of the language are generated according to the following definition:
A := P | ⊥ | ¬B | B ∧ C | B ∨ C | B ⊃ C | Beli(C|B)
In the following, let ∧ and ∨ bind stronger than ⊃ and Beli . The conditional belief
operator Beli(C|B) is read as “agent i believes C, given B”. As mentioned in the
introduction, we may define the modalities of unconditional belief and knowledge in
terms of conditional belief as follows:
BeliA =def Beli(A|>) (belief)
KiA =def Beli(⊥|¬A) (knowledge)
An equivalent second-order characterization of knowledge is KiA iff for all B we have
Bel(A|B), meaning that A will persist as a belief no matter what is learnt. Observe
that in the definition of the operator of conditional belief the “given B” part is to be
interpreted as “in case B is added to the set of belief”. In other words, B is to be intended
as a new belief, and not as a new knowledge. Interpreting B as knowledge would lead
to a circularity in the definition KiA =def Beli(⊥|¬A). Furthermore, this operation is
illegitimate, since Beli(KiB|B) is not derivable in the system. An axiomatization of
CDL has been discussed in Board (2004), Pacuit (2013), Baltag and Smets (2008). We
present an alternative axiomatization, HCDL, equivalent to the one in Baltag and Smets
(2008).
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The double implication A ⊃⊂ B is defined in the standard way as (A ⊃ B)∧(B ⊃ A).
We denote by `HCDL derivability in HCDL, so `HCDL A means that A is a theorem in
HCDL.
(AX.0) Any axiomatization of classical propositional calculus including modus ponens
(AX.1) If `HCDL B, then `HCDL Beli(B|A)
(AX.2) If ` A ⊃⊂ B, then ` Beli(C|A) ⊃⊂ Beli(C|B) epistemization rule
(AX.3) (Beli(B|A) ∧ Beli(B ⊃ C|A)) ⊃ Beli(C|A) distribution axiom
(AX.4) Beli(A|A) success axiom
(AX.5) Beli(B|A) ⊃ (Beli(C|A ∧B) ⊃⊂ Beli(C|A)) minimal change I
(AX.6) ¬Beli(¬B|A) ⊃ (Beli(C|A ∧B) ⊃⊂ Beli(B ⊃ C|A)) minimal change II
(AX.7) Beli(B|A) ⊃ Beli(Beli(B|A)|C) positive introspection
(AX.8) ¬Beli(B|A) ⊃ Beli(¬Beli(B|A)|C) negative introspection
(AX.9) A ⊃ ¬Beli(⊥|A) consistency
Note that Axiom 6 can be equivalently replaced by the following axioms:
(AX.6a) ¬Beli(¬B|A) ⊃ (Beli(C|A) ⊃ Beli(C|A ∧B)
(AX.6b) Beli(C|A ∧B) ⊃ Beli(B ⊃ C|A)
Axiom 6b is in turn equivalent to the following axiom:
(AX.10) (Beli(C|A) ∧ Beli(C|B)) ⊃ Beli(C|A ∨B)
In terms of belief revision, the above axioms may be understood as a sort of epistemic
and internalized version of the AGM postulates. Some remarks are in order (we refer
to Board, 2004 for a deeper discussion): Distribution axiom (3) and epistemization rule
(2) express deductive closure of beliefs. Success axiom (4) ensures that the learned
information is included in the set of beliefs. Axioms (5) and (6) encode the minimal
change principle, a basic assumption of belief revision (see the correspondence with
AGM postulates K*7 and K*8). Axiom (9) ensures that learning a true information
cannot lead to inconsistent beliefs (it roughly corresponds to AGM K*5). The standard
characterization of knowledge as an S5-modality, i.e. the following laws
KiA ⊃ A KiA ⊃ KiKiA ¬KiA ⊃ Ki¬KiA
can be derived from its definition in terms of conditional belief and the above axioms.
2.2 Neighbourhood semantics
We introduce a semantics for CDL based on neighbourhood models, or N -models for
short. As explained in the introduction, these are a multi-agent version of the sphere
models introduced by Lewis (1973) for the logic of counterfactuals.
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Definition 2.1. Let A be a set of agents. A multi-agent neighbourhood model has
the form M = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K〉 where W is a nonempty set;3 for each i ∈ A, Ii is a
neighbourhood function Ii : W → P(P(W )) that assigns a collection of sets of worlds to
each world in W ; J K : Atm→ P(W ) is the propositional evaluation.
For i ∈ A, x ∈W , Ii satisfies the following properties:
- Nonemptiness: ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α 6= ∅;
- Nesting : ∀α, β ∈ Ii(x) . α ⊆ β or β ⊆ α;
- Total reflexivity : ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α;
- Local absoluteness: If α ∈ Ii(x) and y ∈ α then Ii(x) = Ii(y);
- Strong closure under intersection: If S ⊆ Ii(x) and S 6= ∅ then
⋂
S ∈ S.
The truth conditions for formulas of the language are given inductively by extending the
evaluation function J K as follows:
- For the Boolean cases the clauses are standard: JA ∧ BK ≡ JAK ∩ JBK, J¬AK ≡
W − JAK, JA ∨BK ≡ JAK ∪ JBK, JA ⊃ BK ≡ (W − JAK) ∪ JBK;
- x ∈ JBeli(B|A) K iff (∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α∩ JAK = ∅) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∩ JAK 6= ∅ and β ⊆JA ⊃ BK)
A formula A is valid inM if JAK = W . We say that A is valid in the class of neighbour-
hood models if A is valid in every neighbourhood model M.
Observe that total reflexivity entails that every Ii(x) is non-empty, whereas strong clo-
sure under intersection always holds in finite models, because of non-emptiness and
nesting.
Notational convention: We often write M, x  A, meaning x ∈ JAK. This is further
shortened to x  A wheneverM is unambiguous. Then, we use the local forcing relations
introduced in Negri (2017b):
α ∀ A iff ∀y ∈ α . y  A and α ∃ A iff ∃y ∈ α . y  A
With this notation, the truth condition of conditional belief Beli becomes:
x  Beli(B|A) iff (∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬A) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ A and β ∀ A ⊃ B)
It is worth noticing that with the notation just introduced, the semantic definition of
the unconditional belief and knowledge operators can be stated as follows:
x  BeliB iff ∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∀ B and x  KiB iff ∀β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∀ B
It can be easily shown that the axiomatization is sound with respect to neighbourhood
semantics:
3As in the sphere models semantics, W can be thought as the set of possible worlds.
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Theorem 2.1. For any formula A, if `HCDL A, then A is valid in the class of neighbour-
hood models.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of A defined in the standard way.
As an example, we show validity of Axiom 6a, Axiom 7 and Axiom 9.
(AX.6a) ¬Beli(¬B|A) ⊃ (Beli(C|A) ⊃ Beli(C|A ∧ B). Let us assume that there is
a model M which satisfies the antecedent but does not satisfy the consequent of the
axiom at world x. Thus, assume M, x  ¬Beli(¬B|A), M, x  Beli(C|A) and M, x 1
Beli(C|A ∧B). We now have the following:
1. ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∃ A
2. ∀δ ∈ Ii(x) . δ ∃ A → δ ∃ A ∧B
3. (∀α ∈ Ii(x)α ∀ ¬A) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ A and β ∀ A ⊃ C)
4. ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∃ A ∧B
5. ∀δ ∈ Ii(x) . δ ∃ A ∧B → δ ∃ A ∧B ∧ ¬C
The first disjunct of 3. does not hold, since it contradicts 1. From the second disjunct of
3, we have that there exists a β0 such that β0 ∃ A. From 2, we have that β0 ∃ A∧B.
Then, from 5. we have that β0 ∃ A ∧ B ∧ ¬C. Thus, there exists y ∈ β0 such that
y  A ∧B ∧ ¬C. From 3. we have that y  A ⊃ C: contradiction.
From 3. we also have that β0 ∀ A ⊃ C: contradiction.
(AX.7) Beli(B|A) ⊃ Beli(Beli(B|A)|C). Again, supposeM, x  Beli(B|A) andM, x 1
Beli(Beli(B|A)|C). Thus,
1. (∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α  ¬A) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ A and β ∀ A ⊃ B)
2. ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∃ C
3. ∀β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ C → (β ∃ C and ¬Beli(B|A)
From 3. we have 4. ∃y ∈ β. y  C and y  ¬Beli(B|A), i.e. 5. ∃γ ∈ Ii(y) . γ ∃ A and
6. ∀δ ∈ Ii(y). δ ∃ A → δ ∃ A ∧ ¬B. By the absoluteness condition applied to 4.,
since β ∈ Ii(x) and y ∈ β, we have Ii(x) = Ii(y). Observe that the first disjunct of 1.
does not hold, since it contradicts 5. Thus, the second disjunct of 1. holds, and we have
that 7. ∃β ∈ Ii(x) = Ii(y) . β ∃ A and β ∀ A ⊃ B. This contradicts with 6.
(AX.9) A ⊃ ¬Beli(⊥|A). Suppose M, x  A and M, x  Beli(⊥|A). Thus, ∀α ∈
Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬A or ∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ A and β ∀ A ⊃ ⊥. By total reflexivity the first
disjunct does not hold, since M, x  A and ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α. The second disjunct is
contradictory: we have that ∃y ∈ β . y  A, and that y  A ⊃ ⊥; thus, y  ⊥.
2.3 Direct completeness proof
The purpose of this section is to show the following:
Theorem 2.2. For any formula A, if A is valid in the class of neighbourhood models,
then `HCDL A.
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We shall prove the contrapositive: If 6`HCDL A, then A is not valid in the class of
neighbourhood models. We introduce standard notions and lemmas.
Definition 2.2. Given S ⊆ LCDL, we say that S is inconsistent if it has a finite subset
{B1, . . . Bn} ⊆ S such that `HCDL B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn ⊃ ⊥. We say that S is consistent if it
is not inconsistent. We say that S ⊆ LCDL is maximal consistent if it is consistent and
for any formula A 6∈ S, S ∪ {A} is inconsistent. Let MAXCONS(LCDL) denote the set
of maximal consistent sets of LCDL.
Lemma 2.3. Let S ⊆ LCDL be consistent, then there exists X ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL)
such that S ⊆ X.
Proof. Standard: Let A0, A1, . . . , An . . . be an enumeration of all formulas of LCDL.
Define a sequence of sets X0 = S, Si+1 = Si ∪ {Ai} if Ai is consistent with Si, and
Si+1 = Si if not. Then define X =
⋃
iXi; this set can be proved to be consistent and
maximal.
Lemma 2.4. Let X be in MAXCONS(LCDL). Then the following properties hold:
(i) For any formula A, either A ∈ X or ¬A ∈ X
(ii) A ∧B ∈ X iff A ∈ X and B ∈ X
(iii) A ∨B ∈ X iff A ∈ X or B ∈ X
(iv) A ∈ X and A ⊃ B ∈ X implies B ∈ X
(v) If `HCDL A then A ∈ X
The following lemma contains a list of theorems of CDL used in subsequent proofs.
Lemma 2.5. The following are derivable in CDL:
(1) Beli(B|A) ∧ Beli(C|A) ⊃ Beli(B ∧ C|A)
(2) Beli(⊥|A ∨B) ⊃ (Beli(⊥|A) ∧ Beli(⊥|B))
(3) Beli(⊥|A) ⊃ Beli(¬A|A ∨B)
(4) If `HCDL A ⊃ B then `HCDL Beli(B|A)
(5) Beli(¬D|C ∨D) ⊃ Beli(¬D|C)
(6) Beli(D|C) ⊃ Beli(⊥|¬Beli(D|C))
(7) ¬Beli(D|C) ⊃ Beli(⊥|Beli(D|C))
(8) (¬Beli(¬A|A ∨B) ∧ Beli(¬A|A ∨ C)) ⊃ Beli(¬B|B ∨ C)
Proof. For the sake of readability, we use ` instead of `HCDL to denote derivability in
the axiom system.
(1). We have ` B ⊃ (C ⊃ B ∧C), so by Axiom 1, Beli(B ⊃ (C ⊃ B ∧C)|A). By Axiom
3 (twice) and the assumptions we obtain Bel(B ∧ C|A).
(2). It suffices to show that Beli(⊥|A ∨ B) ⊃ Beli(⊥|A). By propositional reasoning,
Axiom 1, and Axiom 3, from Beli(⊥|A∨B) follows (a) Beli(A|A∨B). Applying Axiom
5 to (a) and Beli(⊥|A ∨ B) we get (b) Beli(⊥|A ∧ (A ∨ B)). Since ` A ⊃ A ∨ B, by
Axiom 1 we have Beli(A ⊃ A ∨B|A); applying Axiom 3 to this formula and to formula
Beli(A|A) (Axiom 4) we have (c) Beli(A ∨ B|A). A final application of Axiom 5 to (b)
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and (c) yields Beli(⊥|A).
(3). Applying propositional reasoning, Axiom 1 and Axiom 3 to Beli(⊥|A) we get
(a) Beli(¬A|A). As in the previous case, we obtain (b) Beli(A ∨ B|A) from Axiom 1
applied to ` A ⊃ A∨B and Axiom 3. Apply Axiom 5 to (a) and (b) to get Beli(¬A|A∧
(A∨B)). Since ` A∧(A∨B) ⊃ A∨B, by propositional reasoning we have Beli(¬A|A∨B).
(4). By Axiom 1, ` A ⊃ B gives ` Beli(A ⊃ B|A). By Axiom 4 we also have ` Beli(A|A),
and by Axiom 3 we conclude that Beli(B|A).
(5). By Axiom 4 we have Beli(C ∨D|C ∨D). By propositional reasoning, we also have
(a) Beli(¬D ⊃ C|C ∨D). Apply Axiom 3 to (a) and to the antecedent Beli(¬D|C ∨D)
to get (b) Beli(C|C ∨D). Then, apply Axiom 5 to the antecedent and (b), and obtain
(c) Beli(¬D|C ∧ (C ∨D)). Formula Beli(C ∨D|C) is derivable, by (4) applied to ` C ⊃
C ∨D. Apply Axiom 5 again to (c) and (4) and obtain the consequent Beli(¬D|C).
(6). From Beli(D|C) and Axiom 7 we obtain (a) Beli(Beli(D|C)|¬Beli(D|C)). By
Axiom 4 we have (b) Beli(¬Beli(D|C)|¬Beli(D|C)). Applying (3) of this Lemma to
(a) and (b) yields Beli(Beli(D|C) ∧ ¬Beli(D|C)|¬Beli(D|C)). This is equivalent to
Beli⊥|¬Beli(D|C)).
(7). From ¬Beli(D|C) and Axiom 8 we obtain (a) Beli(¬Beli(D|C)|Beli(D|C)). Then,
Axiom 4 gives (b) Beli(Beli(D|C)|Beli(D|C)). Apply (1) to (a) and (b) and obtain
Beli(Beli(D|C) ∧ ¬Beli(D|C)|Beli(D|C). Thus, Beli(⊥|Beli(D|C)).
(8). We prove the following equivalent formulation: (Beli(¬A|A ∨ C) ∧ ¬Beli(¬B|B ∨
C)) ⊃ Beli(¬A|A∨B). First, let us prove the following: i)Beli(¬A|A∨C) ⊃ Beli(¬A|A∨
B∨C). It holds that (a) Beli(A∨B∨C|A∨C), by (4) and a suitable propositional formula.
Apply Axiom 5 to (a) and the antecedent of i) and obtain (b) Beli(¬A|(A∨C)∧(A∨B∨C).
By Axiom 4 applied to a ¬A ∧ F , for an arbitrary formula F , Beli(¬A|¬A ∧ F ). Let
F = ¬C ∧ (A∨B ∨C). Thus we have Beli(¬A|¬A∧¬C ∧ (A∨B ∨C)), from which by
propositional reasoning we have c) Beli(¬A|¬(A∨C)∧ (A∨B ∨C)). From (b), (c) and
Axiom 10 we have:
(d) Beli(¬A|(¬(A ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C)) ∨ ((A ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C))
By propositional reasoning, this is equivalent to Beli(¬A|¬(A∨C)∨(A∨C)∧(A∨B∨C),
which is equivalent to Bel(¬A|A ∨B ∨ C).
Then, we prove ii) ¬Beli(¬B|B ∨ C) ⊃ ¬Beli(¬(A ∨ B)|A ∨ B ∨ C). We prove the
contrapositive: Beli(¬(A ∨ B)|A ∨ B ∨ C) ⊃ Beli(¬B|B ∨ C). From the antecedent
derive by propositional reasoning (e) Beli(¬A|A∨B ∨C), and (f) Beli(¬B|A∨B ∨C).
Apply Axiom 5 to the antecedent and (e), and obtain (g) Beli(¬(A∨B)|B ∨C). Apply
Axiom 10 to (f) and (g) to obtain (h) Beli(¬B|(B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C)). Application of
the same axiom to (g) and (h) yields (l) Beli(A ∨ B ∨ C|B ∨ C). A final application of
Axiom 5 to (h) and (l) yields the desired conclusion Beli(¬B|B ∨ C).
We can now proceed with the proof. Apply i) to the first conjunct of the antecedent
Beli(¬A|A∨C) to obtain (a′) Beli(¬A|A∨B ∨C). Apply ii) to the second conjunct of
the antecedent ¬Beli(¬B|B ∨C) and obtain (b′) ¬Beli(¬(A∨B)|A∨B ∨C). Applying
Axiom 6 to (a′) and (b′) yields Beli(¬A|(a∨B ∨C)∧ (A∨B)). Application of the same
axiom to this formula and to the derivable formula Beli(A ∨ B ∨ C|A ∨ B) yields the
desired conclusion Beli(¬A|A ∨B).
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Our goal is to build a canonical neighbourhood modelM such that for any set of formulas
S, if S is consistent then it is satisfiable in M. To this regard:
- The worlds W are the maximal consistent sets: W = MAXCONS(LCDL);
- The propositional evaluation is defined in the obvious way; for an atom P :JP K = {X ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL) | P ∈ X}.
We have to define the neighbourhoods Ii(X) for an element X ∈ W (and this is the
hard part). We proceed similarly to Lewis (1973), defining the notion of an ‘implausible’
set of formulas with respect to X. Then, each implausible set S with respect to X will
provide a neighbourhood of X, namely the set of elements of MAXCONS(LCDL) which
do not contain any formula in S.
Definition 2.3. Let S ⊆ LCDL and X ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL). Define S to be an im-
plausible set with respect to an agent i and a maximal consistent set X whenever the
following conditions hold:
(i) For any formula A, if Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X then A ∈ S;
(ii) If A ∈ S and B 6∈ S then Beli(¬A|A ∨B) ∈ X.
We denote by IMPLAi(X) the set of all implausible sets S with respect to X and i.
Intuitively, condition (i) means that S contain all formulas that lead agent i to believe an
absurdity, whereas condition (ii) means that for each A ∈ S and B 6∈ S, agent i considers
B strictly more plausible than A, that is, if i learns A ∨ B then she would believe ¬A,
(whence she would believe B, since from Beli(¬A|A ∨B) follows Beli(B|A ∨B)).
Lemma 2.6. The following hold:
(i) If S1, S2 ∈ IMPLAi(X) then S1 ⊆ S2 or S2 ⊆ S1;
(ii) LCDL ∈ IMPLAi(X);
(iii) Let S ∈ IMPLAi(X) with S 6= LCDL; for any A, if `HCDL A then A 6∈ S;
(iv) IMPLAi(X) has a smallest element:
SminX = {A ∈ LCDL|Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X}.
Proof.
(i) Suppose the contrary and let A ∈ S1 \ S2 and B ∈ S2 \ S1; by condition (ii) in
Definition 2.3 we get Beli(¬A|A ∨ B) ∈ X and Beli(¬B|A ∨ B) ∈ X. By (1) of
Lemma 2.5 we have Beli(¬(A∨B)|A∨B) ∈ X, and since Beli(A∨B|A∨B) ∈ X,
we get Beli(⊥|A∨B) ∈ X. By (2) of Lemma 2.5, this implies both Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X
and Beli(⊥|B) ∈ X, violating condition (i) of definition of implausible set for both
S1 and S2.
(ii) Obvious, since the antecedent of condition (ii) in Definition 2.3 is always false.
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(iii) Suppose the contrary: let `HCDL A and A ∈ S. Since S 6= LCDL, let B 6∈ S.
Then by (ii) of Definition 2.3 we have (1) Beli(¬A|A ∨ B) ∈ X. Since `HCDL A
we also have A ∈ X and ` Beli(⊥ |¬A) and therefore Beli(⊥ |¬A) ∈ X so (2)
Beli(A|A∨B) ∈ X by (3) of Lemma 2.5. By (1) and (2) Beli(⊥|A∨B) ∈ X, which
implies Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X, whence we obtain A 6∈ X, thus a contradiction.
(iv) It suffices to show that SminX satisfies condition (ii) of the definition of implausible
set. Let A ∈ SminX ; then Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X, whence for any B, by (3) of Lemma 2.5,
Beli(¬A|A ∨B) ∈ X.
For any set S ⊆ LCDL we define:
CO(S) = {Y ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL) |Y ∩ S = ∅}
Ii(X) = {CO(S)| S ∈ IMPLAi(X) and S 6= LCDL}
Intuitively, each sphere α will be defined as a set CO(S): a sphere is thus determined
by an implausible set of formulas S, i.e. a sphere is the set of worlds not containing any
implausible formula with respect to X. Then, Ii(X) is the set of spheres determined by
each set of formulas S.
It trivially holds that CO(LCDL) = ∅; furthermore, it can be proved that if S ∈
IMPLAi(X) and S 6= LCDL then CO(S) 6= ∅ (the proof is similar to the one of the
following Lemma 2.7). Observe that the largest neighbourhood is CO(SminX ) which
contains all Y that do not contain any formula considered “impossible” for X.
The following lemma is similar to Lewis’ Cosphere Lemma (Lewis, 1973), and will
be widely used in the sequel.
Lemma 2.7. Let α ∈ Ii(X) with α = CO(S) for some S ∈ IMPLAi(X). Then for any
formula A it holds that A ∈ S if and only if for all Y ∈ α it holds that A 6∈ Y (thus
¬A ∈ Y ).
Proof. To prove direction (⇒), suppose A ∈ S then by definition of α = CO(S), for all
Y ∈ α it holds A 6∈ Y .
To prove direction (⇐), suppose that for all Y ∈ α = CO(S) it holds that A 6∈ Y , and
by reductio ad absurdum that A 6∈ S. Let us consider the set {¬B |B ∈ S}. Suppose
first that {¬B |B ∈ S} ∪ {A} is consistent. Then for some Z ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL),
we have {¬B |B ∈ S} ∪ {A} ⊆ Z (Lemma 2.3). We get that Z ∩ S = ∅, so that
Z ∈ α = CO(S). But since A ∈ Z, we have a contradiction with the hypothesis. Thus
{¬B |B ∈ S} ∪ {A} is inconsistent; this means that there is a finite set {¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn}
such that:
`HCDL (¬B1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Bn) ⊃ ¬A
which is the same as
`HCDL A ⊃ (B1 ∨ . . . ∨Bn).
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It follows that
(1) Beli(B1 ∨ . . . ∨Bn|A) ∈ X
For each Bk it holds that Bk ∈ S and A 6∈ S; thus, by condition (ii) of Definition 2.3 we
have Beli(¬Bk|A ∨Bk) ∈ X. This implies that Beli(¬Bk|A) ∈ X for each (i), whence
(2) Beli(¬(B1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Bn)|A) ∈ X
But (1) and (2) imply Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X. Thus, by condition (i) of Definition 2.3, A ∈ S,
against the assumption A /∈ S.
We are finally ready for the main result. Let us define the canonical model M =
〈W, Ii, J K〉, where W = MAXCONS(LCDL), and J K, Ii are defined as before. We prove
that M is indeed a multi-agent neighbourhood model and that it correctly gives the
truth condition for formulas.
The only property we do not show is strong closure under intersection, because we
do not (yet) know whether this property holds in the canonical model. However, this
property is irrelevant for completeness, since (1) the axioms of CDL are valid in models
which do not necessarily satisfy this property, as is shown in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
and (2) by the finite model property, (see end of Section 4) it follows that if a formula
A is satisfiable in a neighbourhood model then A is satisfiable in a finite model, that
in itself satisfies the strong intersection property. Thus the class of formulas which are
valid in models that satisfy the strong intersection property is the same as the class
of formulas that are valid in models that do not necessarily satisfy this property. No
formula can distinguish between models that satisfy and those that do not satisfy the
strong intersection property. The situation could be different if we considered strong
completeness, where we are concerned about derivability of logical consequences of an
infinite theory, not just of valid formulas.
Proposition 2.8. The modelM = 〈W, Ii, J K〉 defined above is a neighbourhood model.
Proof. We show that the properties of nonemptiness, nesting, total reflexivity, and local
absoluteness hold in the model.
Non-emptiness: If α ∈ Ii(X) we want to show that α 6= ∅. Let α = CO(S) for some
S ∈ IMPLAi(X) (S 6= LCDL). Proceed similarly to the (⇐) direction of Lemma 2.7:
consider the set {¬B|B ∈ S}, and prove that it is consistent (by contradiction); thus,
there is a Y ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL) such that {¬B|B ∈ S} ⊆ Y , from which Y ∈ α.
Nesting: Let α, β ∈ Ii(X). Then for some S1, S2 ∈ IMPLAi(X), α = CO(S1) and
β = CO(S2). By Lemma 2.6, either S1 ⊆ S2 or S2 ⊆ S1. In the former case β ⊆ α, in
the latter α ⊆ β.
Total reflexivity: GivenX ∈W , let us consider the set SminX = {A ∈ LCDL|Beli(⊥|A) ∈
X} ∈ IMPLAi(X). If A ∈ SminX then Beli(⊥|A) ∈ X; thus by Axiom (9) ¬A ∈ X,
whence A 6∈ X. We have shown that SminX ∩X = ∅, thus X ∈ CO(SminX ).
Local absoluteness: Let α ∈ Ii(X) and Y ∈ α; we have to show that Ii(X) = Ii(Y ).
To this purpose it is enough to show that IMPLAi(X) = IMPLAi(Y ). To prove this
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it suffices to show that for any formulas C,D we have Beli(D|C) ∈ X if and only if
Beli(D|C) ∈ Y , since the conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 2.3 only involve formulas of
this form (including the particular case of D = ⊥). We know that α ⊆ CO(SminX ). From
Beli(D|C) ∈ X, and from (6) of Lemma 2.5 it follows that Beli(⊥|¬Beli(D|C)) ∈ X.
Thus ¬Beli(D|C)) ∈ SminX , and since Y ∈ CO(SminX ), we have that ¬Beli(D|C) 6∈ Y ,
so Beli(D|C) ∈ Y . Conversely, suppose that Beli(D|C) 6∈ X, then ¬Beli(D|C) ∈ X,
thus also Beli(⊥|Beli(D|C)) ∈ X (by (7) of Lemma 2.5). We have that Beli(D|C) ∈
CO(SminX ), and since Y ∈ CO(SminX ) we finally obtain Beli(D|C) 6∈ Y .
Here is the main proposition.
Proposition 2.9. Given the canonical model M = 〈W, Ii, J K〉 defined above, for any
formula A and any X ∈W , we have X  A if and only if A ∈ X.
Proof. By induction on the weight of A, defined as follows (see also Definition 3.1):
w(P ) = w(⊥) = 1; w(¬A) = w(A) + 2; w(A ◦ B) = w(A) + w(B) + 1 for ◦ conjunction,
disjunction, or implication; w(Beli(B|A)) = w(A) + w(B) + 2.
The base case (A is atomic) holds by definition. The inductive cases of Boolean com-
binations easily follow by the properties of maximal consistent sets. The only interesting
case is the one of A = Beli(D|C). We show that X  Beli(D|C) iff Beli(D|C) ∈ X.
Suppose that X  Beli(D|C). Thus either (1) for each α ∈ Ii(X), α ∀ ¬C or
(2) there is there is α ∈ Ii(X) such that α ∃ C and α ∀ C ⊃ D. In case (1), let
us consider α = CO(SminX ). We have that for all Y ∈ α, Y 6 C, thus by inductive
hypothesis, C 6∈ Y . By Lemma 2.7, we get C ∈ SminX , thus Beli(⊥|C) ∈ X, whence
also Beli(D|C) ∈ X. In case (2), let α = CO(S) for some S ∈ IMPLAi(X). Then,
since α ∃ C for some Y ∈ α, we have Y  C; thus by inductive hypothesis, C ∈ Y .
By Lemma 2.7, C 6∈ S. On the other hand α ∀ C ⊃ D, that is α ∀ ¬(C ∧ ¬D),
similarly to case (1). Employing Lemma 2.7 and the inductive hypothesis, we get that
(C ∧ ¬D) ∈ S. Since C 6∈ S, we have that Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|C ∨ (C ∧ ¬D)) ∈ X. But
this implies that Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|C) ∈ X, that is Beli(C ⊃ D)|C) ∈ X, and finally
Beli(D|C) ∈ X.
Conversely, suppose that Beli(D|C) ∈ X. We distinguish different cases.
Case (1). Suppose that Beli(⊥|C) ∈ X. Consider the largest neighbourhood α =
CO(SminX ). We have that C ∈ SminX then for all Y ∈ α we have C 6∈ Y , so that
by inductive hypothesis, Y  ¬C, thus α ∀ ¬C, but this also holds for any other
β ∈ Ii(X), since β ⊆ α. We can conclude that X  Beli(D|C).
Case (2). Suppose that Beli(⊥|C) 6∈ X. Subcase (2.1). Suppose that Beli(⊥|C ∧
¬D) ∈ X. Then again consider α = CO(SminX ); we have that C 6∈ SminX , thus by Lemma
2.7 for some Y ∈ α, C ∈ Y . By inductive hypothesis Y  C, so that α ∃ C. On the
other hand C ∧¬D ∈ SminX and reasoning as in (case 1), we finally get α ∀ C ⊃ D. We
have shown that X  Beli(D|C).
Subcase (2.2). Suppose that Beli(⊥|C ∧ ¬D) 6∈ X. This is the most difficult case.
Let us consider the following set:
S = {E ∈ LCDL|¬Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|(C ∧ ¬D) ∨ E) ∈ X or Beli(⊥|E) ∈ X}
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We first show that a) C ∧¬D ∈ S: to see this suppose on the contrary that it does not,
then Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|(C ∧ ¬D)) ∈ X. We obtain that Beli(⊥|(C ∧ ¬D)) ∈ X, against
the hypothesis of subcase (2.2).
We also show that b) C 6∈ S. Suppose on the contrary that C ∈ S; since Beli(⊥|C) 6∈
X, it must be
¬Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|(C ∧ ¬D) ∨ C) ∈ X
But C ≡ (C ∧ ¬D) ∨ C, thus we have ¬Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|C) ∈ X, that is ¬Beli(C ⊃
D|C) ∈ X, so that finally ¬Beli(D|C) ∈ X against the hypothesis Beli(D|C) ∈ X.
We now show that S ∈ IMPLAi(X). Clearly S satisfies condition (i) Definition 2.3.
We want to show that S satisfies also condition (ii). To this purpose let G ∈ S and
H 6∈ S. Since G ∈ S, we have: Beli(⊥|G) ∈ X or ¬Beli(¬(C ∧¬D)|(C ∧¬D)∨G) ∈ X.
In the former case we get Beli(¬G|H ∨G) ∈ X by (4) of Lemma 2.5, fulfilling condition
(ii). Otherwise we have (1) ¬Beli(¬(C ∧ ¬D)|(C ∧ ¬D) ∨ G) ∈ X. We have that
H 6∈ S, which means that: Beli(⊥|H) 6∈ X and (2) Beli(¬(C ∧¬D)|(C ∧¬D)∨H) ∈ X.
From (1) and (2) we obtain (by (8) of Lemma 2.5) again Beli(¬G|H ∨ G) ∈ X. Thus
S ∈ IMPLAi(X).
Let us consider β = CO(S). We have that C 6∈ S and C ∧ ¬D ∈ S, as shown above
in a) and b). By Lemma 2.7 we have for some Y ∈ β, C ∈ Y , whence by inductive
hypothesis Y  C and β ∃ C. Similarly by Lemma 2.7 for all Y ∈ β, C ∧ ¬D 6∈ Y ,
whence by inductive hypothesis for all Y ∈ β Y  ¬(C ∧ ¬D), that is Y  C ⊃ D, that
is β ∀ C ⊃ D. We have shown that X  Beli(D|C).
We conclude the proof of the completeness theorem in the standard way. Suppose that
6`HCDL A; then there is X ∈ MAXCONS(LCDL) such that ¬A ∈ X and A 6∈ X. We
consider the canonical model M = 〈W, Ii, J K〉, we have that X ∈ W and by the above
proposition X 6 A. Thus A is not valid in M.
3 Sequent calculus
The neighbourhood semantics is used to generate a labelled sequent calculus, G3CDL,
for CDL; this generation follows the methodology established in Negri (2005), of internal-
izing possible worlds semantics into the syntax of a contraction-free sequent system. A
neighbourhood semantics is, however, more general than a standard (relational) possible
worlds semantics, and there are non-trivial issues to be faced when the internalization
method is applied. A methodological discussion on the stages needed to find the rules
of a well-behaved sequent calculus starting from the meaning explanation of the logical
constants in terms of a neighbourhood semantics is given in Negri (2017a). The steps
needed to establish the structural properties of sequent calculi based on neighbourhood
semantics are carried over for some basic non-normal modal systems in Negri (2017b).
The calculus G3CDL displays two kinds of labels: labels for worlds x, y. . . . and
labels for neighbourhoods a, b . . . , as in the ground calculus for neighbourhood semantics
introduced in Negri (2017b).
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The meaning of the expressions employed in the calculus is defined as follows, where on
the right side we assume that x ranges over possible worlds and a, b over neighbourhoods
of possible worlds:
a ∃ A ≡ ∃x . x ∈ a and x  A
a ∀ A ≡ ∀x . x ∈ a→ x  A
x i B|A ≡ ∃c . c ∈ Ii(x) and c ∃ A and c ∀ A ⊃ B
x : Beli(B|A) ≡ ∀a ∈ Ii(x) . a ∃ A→ (∃b ∈ Ii(x) . b ∃ A and b ∀ A ⊃ B)
Here  denotes the forcing condition of neighbourhood semantics; to distinguish the se-
mantic notion and its syntactic counterpart and for the sake of a more compact notation,
we use a colon in the labelled calculus.
The rules of G3CDL can be found in Figure 3. The propositional rules are those
of a classical propositional system, decorated with labels. The rules for local forcing are
defined as in Negri and Olivetti (2015).
Each semantic condition on neighbourhood models (Definition 2.1) is in correspon-
dence with a rule in the calculus. Rule (S) corresponds to the property of nesting in
Definition 2.1; (T ) corresponds to total reflexivity, and (A) to local absoluteness. As for
non-emptiness, the property is expressed by the rules for local forcing. The property of
strong closure under intersection needs not be expressed, because the property holds in
finite models and we shall prove that the logic has the finite model property (see end
of Section 4). Moreover, we wish to obtain a calculus in which the contraction rule is
height-preserving admissible (Negri, 2005). To this purpose, a few rules keep their prin-
cipal formula in their premisses: (L ∀), (R∃), (LB) and (RC). Moreover, some extra
care is needed for rules that may have instances with a duplication of atomic formulas
in their conclusion. In G3CDL, the rules which are potentially subject to this condi-
tion are (S) (sphere nesting) and (A1) (absoluteness), for the case in which a = b. In
these cases, a closure condition has to be applied: a rule featuring duplicated formulas
contracted into one single formula both in the premiss(es) and in the conclusion has to
be added to the calculus. For (S), the instance with the duplication is
a ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ a ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ S
and the contracted instance is
a ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ a ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ S
∗
This rule does not need to be added to the calculus because it reduces (with two identical
premisses one of which is superfluous) to an instance of Ref.
As for (A1), the instance with a duplication has the following form
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∈ Ii(y),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
A1
whereas the contracted instance is rule (A2); observe that (A2) is not an instance of any
of the pre-existing rules of the calculus so it has to be explicitly added in order to satisfy
the closure condition and thus ensure admissibility of contraction.
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Initial sequents
x : P,Γ⇒ ∆, x : P
Rules for local forcing
x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A
Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A R
∀(x fresh)
x : A, x ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
x ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆ L
∀
x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A, a ∃ A
x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A R
∃ x ∈ a, x : A,Γ⇒ ∆
a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆ L
∃(x fresh)
Propositional rules
x : A, x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
x : A ∧B,Γ⇒ ∆ L∧
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A Γ⇒ ∆, x : B
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A ∧B R∧
x : A,Γ⇒ ∆ x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
x : A ∨B,Γ⇒ ∆ L∨
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A ∨B
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A, x : B R∨
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A x : B,Γ⇒ ∆
x : A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆ L⊃
x : A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : B
Γ⇒ ∆, x : A ⊃ B R⊃
⊥,Γ⇒ ∆L⊥
Rules for conditional belief
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A)
RB(a fresh)
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A x i B|A, a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆ LB
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A RC
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆
x i B|A,Γ⇒ ∆
LC(a fresh)
Rules for inclusion
a ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ Ref
c ⊆ a, c ⊆ b, b ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆
c ⊆ b, b ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆ Tr
x ∈ a, a ⊆ b, x ∈ b,Γ⇒ ∆
x ∈ a, a ⊆ b,Γ⇒ ∆ L⊆
Rules for semantic conditions
a ⊆ b, a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ b ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ S
x ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆ T (a fresh)
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(y),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, b ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆
A1
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(y),Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆
A2
Figure 1: Rules of G3CDL
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Example 3.1. We show a derivation of the left-to-right direction of axiom (6). We omit
writing in the final derivation the derivable left premisses of rule (RC) in D and of rule
(LB), as well as the derivable right premiss of (L ⊃).
D : y : A · · · ⇒ . . . y : A y : B · · · ⇒ . . . y : B
y : A, y : B, y ∈ b, c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, b ∈ Ii(x) · · · ⇒ . . . y : A ∧B
R∧
y : A, y : B, y ∈ b, c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, b ∈ Ii(x) · · · ⇒ . . . b ∃ A ∧B
R∃
y ∈ b, c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, b ∈ Ii(x) · · · ⇒ . . . b ∃ A ∧B, y : A ⊃ ¬B
R⊃,R⊃
c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, b ∈ Ii(x) · · · ⇒ . . . b ∃ A ∧B, b ∀ A ⊃ ¬B
R∀
c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, b ∈ Ii(x) · · · ⇒ . . . b ∃ A ∧B, x i ¬B|A
RC
b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ C, a ∃ A ∧B · · · ⇒ . . . x : Beli (¬B|A), b ∃ A ∧B
RB
E :
z : A · · · ⇒ . . . z : A z : c · · · ⇒ . . . z : C
z : A ⊃ C, z : A, z : B, z ∈ b, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ C, a ∃ A ∧B, · · · ⇒ . . . z : C
L⊃
z : A, z : B, z ∈ b, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ C, a ∃ A ∧B · · · ⇒ . . . z : C
L∀
z ∈ b, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ C, a ∃ A ∧B · · · ⇒ . . . z : (A ∧B) ⊃ C
R⊃,L∧






b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ C, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A ∧B, x : Beli (C|A)⇒ x : Beli (¬B|A), x i C|A ∧B
RC
x i C|A, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A ∧B, x : Beli (C|A)⇒ x : Beli (¬B|A), x i C|A ∧B
LC
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A ∧B, x : Beli (C|A)⇒ x : Beli (¬B|A), x i C|A ∧B
LB
x : Beli (C|A)⇒ x : Beli (¬B|A), x : Beli (C|A ∧B)
RB
x : ¬(Beli (¬B|A)), x : Beli (C|A)⇒ x : Beli (C|A ∧B)
L⊃
3.1 Rules for knowledge and simple belief
As recalled in Section 2.1, the modal operators of knowledge and simple belief can be
defined in terms of the conditional belief operator: KiA = Beli(⊥|¬A) and BeliA =
Beli(A|>). By adopting these definitions, we can extend G3CDL by the rules displayed
below which correspond to the interpretation of these two modalities in neighbourhood
semantics.
Rules for knowledge and simple belief
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A
Γ⇒ ∆, x : KiA LK(a fresh)
a ∈ Ii(x), x : KiA, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), x : KiA,Γ⇒ ∆ RK
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x : BeliA, a ∀ A
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x : BeliA LSB
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∀ A⇒ ∆
x : BeliA,Γ⇒ ∆ RSB(a fresh)
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These rules are admissible in G3CDL, i.e. whenever the premiss is derivable, also the
conclusion is. This is shown through a derivation that uses rules of G3CDL and other
rules (such as weakening and cut) which will be later shown to be admissible. By way
of example, we show the case of rule (RK).
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(⊥|¬A), a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(⊥|¬A),Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ ¬A
∗
...y : ¬A⇒ y : ¬A... y : ⊥ ⇒ ...
y : ¬A ⊃ ⊥, y : ¬A, y : ¬A...Γ⇒ ∆ L⊃
y ∈ b, y : ¬A, b ∀ ¬A ⊃ ⊥...Γ⇒ ∆ L
∀
b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ ¬A, b ∀ ¬A ⊃ ⊥...Γ⇒ ∆
L∃
x i ⊥|¬A...Γ⇒ ∆ LC
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(⊥|¬A),Γ⇒ ∆ LB
In the above derivation, the left premiss of (LB) is derivable from the premiss of (RK);
the right premiss of (LB) is derivable from initial sequents. The step denoted by (∗) is
justified by the rules for negation.
3.2 Structural properties
In this section we prove the principal structural properties of the calculus, among which
the admissibility of cut. Admissibility of cut is a fundamental property, as it ensures
that the calculus is consistent (whence the logic); moreover, it ensures the subformula
property, meaning that no new formulas are introduced in backwards proof search of a
given sequent.
The syntactic proof of cut admissibility requires to establish several properties, which
are also important from a computational viewpoint. Basically, we have to show that the
structural rules are height-preserving admissible, that label substitution is admissible
and that logical rules are invertible.
We start by defining a notion of weight of labelled formulas:4
Definition 3.1. The label of formulas of the form x : A is x. The label of formulas of
the form a ∀ A and a ∃ A is a. The label of a formula F will be denoted by l(F). The
pure part of a labelled formula F is the part without the label and without the forcing
relation, either local (∃, ∀) or worldwise (:) and will be denoted by p(F).
The weight of a labelled formula F is the pair (w(p(F)), w(l(F))), where:
(i) For all world labels x and all neighbourhood labels a, w(x) = 0, w(a) = 1;
(ii) w(P ) = w(⊥) = 1; w(¬A) = w(A)+2; w(A◦B) = w(A)+w(B)+1 for ◦ conjunction,
disjunction, or implication; w(B|A) = w(A)+w(B)+2; w(Beli(B|A)) = w(B|A)+1.
Weights of labelled formulas are ordered lexicographically.
4A different notion of weight, which does not take labels into account, will be introduced and used
in 5.2 to show that the “new” and the “old” semantics have the same class of valid formulas.
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It is clear from the definition of weight that the weight gets decreased if we move from
a formula labelled by a neighbourhood label to the same formula labelled by a world
label, or if we move (regardless of the label) to a formula with a pure part of strictly
smaller weight.
Lemma 3.1. Sequents of the following form are derivable in G3CDL for arbitrary
neighbourhoods labels a, b and formulas A and B:
(i) a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A
(ii) a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A
(iii) x i B|A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
(iv) x : A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A
Proof. All cases are proved by simultaneous induction on formula weight.
(i) We have the following inference
x : A, x ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A
x ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A L
∀
a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A R
∀
The topsequent is derivable by inductive hypothesis because w(x : A) < w(a ∀ A).
(ii) Similar, with (L∃) and R∃ in place of (R∀) and (L ∀), respectively, using
w(x : A) < w(a ∃ A).
(iii) By the derivation
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A
... a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
RC
x i B|A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A LC
Both topsequents are derivable by inductive hypothesis, since w(a ∃ A) < w(x i B|A)
and w(a ∀ A ⊃ B) < w(x i B|A).
(iv) By induction on the structure of A. If it is atomic or ⊥, the sequent is initial or
conclusion of (L⊥). If the outermost connective of A is a conjunction or a disjunction,
or an implication, the sequent is derivable by application of the respective rules and the
inductive hypothesis. If A is a formula of conditional belief we have
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A
... x i B|A, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
LB
x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A) RB
The topsequents are derivable by inductive hypothesis, since w(a ∃ A) < w(x : Beli(B|A))
and w(x i B|A) < w(x : Beli(B|A)).
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The definition of substitution of labels given in Negri (2005) can be extended in an ob-
vious way—that need not be detailed here—to all the formulas of our language and to
neighbourhood labels. With this definition we have, for example, (a ∃ A)(b/a) ≡ b ∃
A, and (x i B|A)(y/x) ≡ y i B|A. The calculus is routinely shown to enjoy the prop-
erty of height preserving (hp for short) substitution both of world and neighbourhood
labels:
Proposition 3.2.
(i) If `n Γ⇒ ∆, then `n Γ(y/x)⇒ ∆(y/x);
(ii) If `n Γ⇒ ∆, then `n Γ(b/a)⇒ ∆(b/a).
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation. If it is 0, then Γ⇒ ∆ is an initial
sequent or a conclusion of (L⊥). The same then holds for Γ(y/x) ⇒ ∆(y/x) and for
Γ(b/a) ⇒ ∆(b/a). If the derivation has height n > 0, we consider the last rule applied.
If Γ⇒ ∆ has been derived by a rule without variable conditions, we apply the inductive
hypothesis and then the rule. Rules with variable conditions require some care in case
the substituted variable coincides with the fresh variable in the premiss. This is the case
for the rules (R∀), (L∃), (RB), (LC), (T ). So, if Γ⇒ ∆ has been derived by any of
these rules, we apply the inductive hypothesis twice to the premiss: the first application
replaces the fresh variable with another fresh variable different, if necessary, from the
one we want to substitute; the second occurrence applies the substitution, and finally
we apply the rule.
Proposition 3.3. The rules of left and right weakening are hp-admissible in G3CDL.
Proof. Straightforward induction, with a similar proviso as in the above proof for rules
with variable conditions.
Next, we prove hp-invertibility of the rules of G3CDL, i.e. for every rule of the form
Γ′⇒∆′
Γ⇒∆ , if `n Γ ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, and for every rule of the form Γ
′⇒∆′ Γ′′⇒∆′′
Γ⇒∆ if
`n Γ⇒ ∆ then `n Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ and `n Γ′′ ⇒ ∆′′.
Lemma 3.4. The following hold in G3CDL:
1. If `n Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A then `n x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A for any x.
2. If `n x ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆ then `n x ∈ a, x : A, a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆.
3. If `n x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, a ∃ A then `n x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A, a ∃ A.
4. If `n a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆ then `n x ∈ a, x : A,Γ⇒ ∆ for any x.
5. If `n Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A) then `n a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A for any a.
6. If `n a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ ⇒ ∆ then `n a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ ⇒
∆, a ∃ A and x i B|A, a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ⇒ ∆.
7. If `n a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A then `n a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A and
`n a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B.
8. If `n x i B|A,Γ⇒ ∆ then `n a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ⇒ ∆ for any a.
9. If `n a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ ⇒ ∆ then `n a ⊆ b, a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ ⇒ ∆ and
`n b ⊆ a, a ∈ Ii(x), b ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆.
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10. If `n Γ⇒ ∆ then `n x ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆ for any x and a.
11. If `n a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, b ∈ Ii(x),Γ ⇒ ∆ then `n a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∈
Ii(y),Γ⇒ ∆.
12. If `n x ∈ a, a ⊆ b,Γ⇒ ∆ then `n x ∈ a, a ⊆ b, x ∈ b,Γ⇒ ∆.
13. If `n Γ⇒ ∆ then `n a ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆.
14. If `n c ⊆ b, b ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆ then `n c ⊆ a, c ⊆ b, b ⊆ a,Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the height n of the derivation. Base case: Suppose
that Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A) is an initial sequent or conclusion of L⊥. In the former case,
since x : Beli(B|A) is neither of the form x : P nor of the form x ∈ a, we have that
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ ⇒ ∆, x i B|A is an initial sequent as well; in the latter case,
it is a conclusion of L⊥. Inductive step: We show only the case of (5), by means of
example. Assume hp-invertibility up to n, and assume `n+1 Γ ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A). If
x : Beli(B|A) is principal in the last rule of the derivation, then the premiss is of the
form a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, with a fresh, and has a derivation of height
n. We obtain the claim for any a by hp-substitution. Otherwise, x : Beli(B|A) is not
principal, the last rule has one or two premisses of the form Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, x : Beli(B|A)
of derivation height ≤ n. If the rule has a variable condition, before proceeding we
have to apply an hp-substitution to avoid that the eigenvariable coincides with a. By
inductive hypothesis we have a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, x i B|A for each premiss,
with derivation height at most n. Thus, by application of the same rule, we have
`n+1 a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A.
Lemma 3.5. All the propositional rules of G3CDL are hp-invertible.
Proof. Similar to the proof for G3c (Theorem 3.1.1 in Negri and von Plato, 2001).
Therefore, as a general result, we have:
Corollary 3.6. All the rules of G3CDL are hp-invertible.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.3, the latter because of the general form of the neigh-
bourhood rules.
The rules of contraction of G3CDL have the following form, where F is either a “rela-
tional” atom of the form a ∈ I(x) or of the form x ∈ a, or a labelled formula of one of
the forms x : A, a ∀ A, a ∃ A, or a formula of the form x i B|A or x : Beli(B|A):
F ,F ,Γ⇒ ∆
F ,Γ⇒ ∆ LCtr
Γ⇒ ∆,F ,F
Γ⇒ ∆,F RCtr
Theorem 3.7. The rules of left and right contraction are hp-admissible in G3CDL.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the height of derivation n for left and right con-
traction. If n = 0 the premiss is either an initial sequent or a conclusion of a zero-premiss
rule. In each case, the contracted sequent is also an initial sequent or a conclusion of
the same zero-premiss rule. If n > 0, consider the last rule used to derive the premiss
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of contraction. There are two cases, depending on whether the contraction formula is
principal or a side formula in the rule.
1. If the contraction formula is not principal in it, both occurrences are found
in the premisses of the rule and they have a smaller derivation height. By inductive
hypothesis, they can be contracted and the conclusion is obtained by applying the rule
to the contracted premisses.
2. If the contraction formula is principal in it, we distinguish two sub-cases:
2.1. The last rule is one in which the principal formulas appear also in the premiss
(such as L ∀, R∃, LB, RC, S, A, Tr, L⊆). In all these cases we apply the inductive
hypothesis to the premiss(es) and then the rule. For example, if the last rule use to
derive the premiss of contraction is (RC) we have:
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, x i B|A, a ∃ A a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, x i B|A RC
By inductive hypothesis applied to the premiss, of shorter height, we get a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒
∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A and a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B and thus by a step of
RC we obtain a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, with the same derivation height of the given
premiss of contraction.
2.2. The last rule is one in which the active formulas are proper subformulas of the
principal formula and possibly relational atoms (such as the rules for &, ∨, ⊃, R ∀,
L∃, RB, LC). In all such cases, we apply hp-invertibility to the premiss(es) of the rule
so that we have a duplication of formulas at a smaller derivation height, then apply the
inductive hypothesis (as many times as needed) then the rule in question. For example,
if the last rule is (RB), we have:
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, x : Beli(B|A)
Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A), x : Beli(B|A)
RB (a fresh)
Using hp-invertibility of (RB) we obtain from the premiss a derivation of height n − 1
of
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, x i B|A
By inductive hypothesis we get a derivation of the same height of a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒
∆, x i B|A and application ofRB gives a derivation of height n of Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A).
Theorem 3.8. Cut is admissible in G3CDL.
Proof. By double induction, with primary induction on the weight of the cut formula
and subinduction on the sum of the heights of derivations of the premisses of cut. The
cases in which the premisses of cut are either initial sequents or obtained through the
rules for &, ∨, or ⊃ follow the treatment of Theorem 3.2.3 of Negri and von Plato (2001).
For the cases in which the cut formula is a side formula in at least one rule used to derive
the premisses of cut, the cut reduction is dealt with in the usual way by permutation
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of cut, with possibly an application of hp-substitution to avoid a clash with the fresh
variable in rules with variable condition. In all such cases the cut height is reduced.
The only cases we shall treat in detail are those with cut formula principal in both
premisses of cut and of the form a ∀ A, a ∃ A, x i B|A, x : Beli(B|A).
1. The cut formula is a ∀ A, principal in both premisses of cut. We have a derivation
of the form
D
x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : A
Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A R
∀ y : A, y ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
y ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ L
∀
y ∈ a,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Cut
This is converted into the following derivation:
D(y/x)
y ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, y : A
Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A y : A, y ∈ a, a ∀ A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
y ∈ a, y : A,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Cut1
y : A, x ∈ a,Γ,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆,∆′ Cut2
y ∈ a,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Ctr
∗
Here D(y/x) denotes the result of application of hp-substitution to D, using the fact
that x is a fresh variable; compared to the original cut, Cut1 is a cut of reduced height,
Cut2 is one of reduced weight of cut formula, because w(y : A) < w(a ∀ A), and Ctr∗
denote repreated applications of hp-admissible contraction steps.
2. The cut formula is a ∃ A, principal in both premisses of cut. The cut is reduced
in a way similar to the one in the case above and the inequality to be used on formula
weight is w(y : A) < w(a ∃ A).
3. The cut formula is x i B|A, principal in both premisses of cut. The premisses
of cut are the following:
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A RC
D
b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
x i B|A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ LC
The conclusion of the cut is the sequent a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′. The derivation is
converted into the following:
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∃ A x i B|A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′, a ∃ A
Cut1
(1)
a ∈ Ii(x)3,Γ2,Γ′3 ⇒ ∆2,∆′3
Cut4
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Ctr
∗
Here (1) is the derivation:
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A, a ∀ A ⊃ B x i B|A,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′, a ∀ A ⊃ B
Cut2
D(a/b)
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
a ∈ Ii(x)2, a ∃ A,Γ,Γ′2 ⇒ ∆,∆′2
Cut3
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Observe that all the four cuts are of reduced height (Cut1 and Cut2) or reduced weight
(Cut3 and Cut4) because w(a ∃ A) < w(a ∀ A ⊃ B) < w(x i B|A).
4. The cut formula is x : Beli(B|A), principal in both premisses of cut. The premisses
of cut are the following:
D
b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A) RB
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, a ∃ A a ∈ Ii(x), x i B|A, x : Beli(B|A),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ LB
The conclusion of cut is the sequent a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′. The cut is converted to
four smaller cuts as follows:
Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli(B|A) a ∈ Ii(x), x : Beli(B|A),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, a ∃ A
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′, a ∃ A
Cut2
(2)
a ∈ Ii(x)3,Γ3,Γ′2 ⇒ ∆3,∆′2
Cut4
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ Ctr
∗
Here (2) is the derivation:
D(a/b)
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A,Γ⇒ ∆, x i B|A
Γ⇒ ∆, x : Beli (B|A) a ∈ Ii(x), x i B|A, x : Beli (B|A),Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
a ∈ Ii(x), x i B|A,Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
Cut1
a ∈ Ii(x)2, a ∃ A,Γ2,Γ′ ⇒ ∆2,∆′
Cut3
Observe that the two uppermost cuts (Cut1 and Cut2) have reduced cut height and the
others are cuts on formulas of reduced weight because w(a ∃ A) < w(x i B|A) < w(x :
Beli(B|A)).
With standard Gentzen calculi, admissibility of cut immediately ensures the subformula
property and its immediate consequences such as consistency (by underivability of the
empty sequent). With the calculus that we have introduced we have similar properties,
but we have to be more specific with the precise formulation of the subformula property.
This property, taken literally, would impose that any sequent occurring in a derivation
of a given sequent Γ⇒ ∆ contain only formulas which are subformulas of the formulas
in Γ ⇒ ∆. However, the decomposition of a formula such as Beli(A|B) may introduce
formula A|B, and this latter might introduce A ⊃ B. Neither A|B nor A ⊃ B are,
strictly speaking, subformulas of BeliA|B and A|B respectively. Even if these are not
strictly subformulas, they are less complex formulas built from subformulas of formulas
in the conclusion, and can be accounted for by a less strict notion of subformula. Then,
we have to consider the labels: There are rules, such as Ref, that may introduce arbitrary
labels when read bottom-up. It is easy to prove that Ref can be restricted to a rule that
operates on labels already in the conclusion (by basically the same argument given in
Section 8 of Dyckhoff and Negri, 2012), thereby justifying the fact that in a G3CDL
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derivation all labels are either eigenvariables in rules with freshness condition, or labels
already in the conclusion.
If we extend the notion of subformula to cover these cases, we can conclude that the
calculus is analytic and has the subformula property.
4 Soundness, termination, and completeness
In this section we shall prove soundness of the calculus with respect to the neighbourhood
semantics that we have introduced. For this purpose, we need to interpret labelled
sequents in neighbourhood models, and this requires a notion of realization that connects
the syntactic labels with the semantic elements (possible worlds, neighbourhoods).
Definition 4.1. Let M = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K〉 be a neighbourhood model, S a set of world
labels, and N a set of neighbourhood labels. An SN -realization over M consists of a
pair of functions (ρ, σ) such that
• ρ : S →W is a function that assigns to each x ∈ S an element ρ(x) of W ;
• σ : N → P(W ) is a function that assigns to each a ∈ N an element σ(a) of I(w),
for some w ∈W .
Given a sequent Γ⇒ ∆, with S,N as above, and (ρ, σ) an SN -realization, we say that
Γ ⇒ ∆ is satisfiable in M under the SN -realization (ρ, σ) if the following conditions
hold:
• M ρ,σ a ∈ Ii(x) if σ(a) ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) and M ρ,σ a ⊆ b if σ(a) ⊆ σ(b);
• M ρ,σ x : A if ρ(x)  A;
• M ρ,σ a ∃ A if σ(a) ∃ A and M ρ,σ a ∀ A if σ(a) ∀ A;
• M ρ,σ x i B|A if for some c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), c ∃ A and c ∀ A ⊃ B;
• M ρ,σ x i Beli(B|A) if for all a ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), a ∀ A or M ρ,σ x i B|A;
• M ρ,σ Γ⇒ ∆ if either M 2ρ,σ F for some formula F ∈ Γ or M ρ,σ G for some
formula G ∈ ∆.
Then, define M  Γ⇒ ∆ iff M ρ,σ Γ⇒ ∆ for every SN- realization (ρ, σ). A sequent
Γ ⇒ ∆ is said to be valid if M  Γ ⇒ ∆ holds for every neighbourhood model M, i.e.
if Γ⇒ ∆ is satisfied for every model M and for every SN -realization (ρ, σ).
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). If a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in the calculus, then it is
valid in the class of multi-agent neighbourhood models.
Proof. By induction on the height of the derivation of a sequent Γ⇒ ∆. If the height of
the derivation is 0, the sequent is initial or conclusion of L⊥, and by definition it is valid
in the class of multi-agent neighbourhood models. If the height of the derivation is > 0,
the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ has been derived by one of the rules of the calculus G3CDL. We
prove that all rules preserve validity from the premisses to the conclusion. We consider
in detail the cases in which the last rule applied is one of the rules for conditional belief.
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[RC] Suppose the premisses of the rule are valid, whereas the conclusion is not.
Thus, there is a modelM and a realization (ρ, σ) that falsify the conclusion, i.e. M ρ,σ
a ∈ Ii(x), M ρ,σ F for all F ∈ Γ, M 2ρ,σ G for all G ∈ ∆ and M 2ρ,σ x i B|A, i.e.
1) for all c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) it holds that c ∃ ¬A or c ∀ ¬(A ⊃ B). Since by hypothesis
both premisses are valid, it holds that 2) M ρ,σ a ∃ A and 3) M ρ,σ a ∀ A ⊃ B.
However, 2) and 3) cannot simultaneously hold: if 2) holds, then the first term of the
disjunction in 1) is not satisfied, and the second term must hold, i.e. for all c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)),
c ∃ ¬(A ⊃ B), and this contradicts with 3). A similar contradiction is reached if 3)
holds; thus, one of the premisses is not valid.
[LC] Suppose the premiss is valid and the conclusion is not, i.e. M ρ,σ x i B|A,
M ρ,σ F for all F ∈ Γ andM 2ρ,σ G for all G ∈ ∆, i.e. there exists a c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) such
that c ∃ A and c ∀ A ⊃ B. Now define a new interpretation (ρ′, σ′) such that
ρ′(x) = ρ(x)
σ′(b) = c
σ′(t) = σ(t), for t 6= a
Since the premiss is valid, it is valid under all interpretations; thus, it holds thatM ρ′,σ′
c ∈ Ix, and that M ρ′,σ′ F for all F ∈ Γ and M 2ρ′,σ′ G for all G ∈ ∆. It must hold
that eitherM 2ρ′,σ′ c ∃ A orM 2ρ′,σ′ c ∀ A ⊃ B, which contradicts with c ∃ A and
c ∀ A ⊃ B.
[RB] Suppose the premiss of RB is valid, whereas the conclusion is not. Then there
is a model M and a realization (ρ, σ) which falsify the conclusion, i.e. M ρ,σ F for
all formulas F ∈ Γ, M 2ρ,σ G for all formulas G ∈ ∆ and M 2ρ,σ x : Beli(B|A). This
means ρ(x) 1 Beli(B|A), i.e. there exists a b ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) such that b ∃ A and for all
c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), c ∀ ¬A or c ∃ ¬(A ⊃ B). Now consider the premiss of the rule, and
define a new realization (ρ′, σ′) defined as follows:
ρ′(x) = ρ(x)
σ′(a) = b
σ′(t) = σ(t), for t 6= a
The realization (ρ′, σ′) differs from (ρ, σ) only for the interpretation of the neighbourhood
label a, which is the new neighbourhood introduced in the premiss. Consider the model
M defined above, and the new realization (ρ′, σ′). It holds that M ρ′,σ′ a ∈ Ii(x),
M ρ′,σ′ a ∃ A, andM ρ′,σ′ F for all formulas F ∈ Γ,M 2ρ′,σ′ G for all formulas G ∈
∆. Since the premiss of the rule is valid (hypothesis), it holds that M ρ′,σ′ x i B|A,
which means that for some b ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) it holds that b ∃ A and b ∃ A ⊃ B. However,
this is a contradiction with what stated above, i.e. that for all c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), c ∀ ¬A or
c ∃ ¬(A ⊃ B).
[LB] Suppose the premisses of the rule are valid, whereas the conclusion is not.
Then, there is be a model M and a realization (ρ, σ) which falsify the conclusion, i.e.
M ρ,σ a ∈ Ii(x), M ρ,σ x : Beli(B|A), M ρ,σ F for all F ∈ Γ and M 2ρ,σ G
for all G ∈ ∆. This means that for some σ(a) ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), ρ(x)  x : Beli(B|A), i.e.
1) for all b ∈ Ii(ρ(x)) either b ∀ ¬A or there exists c ∈ Ii(x) such that c ∃ A and
c ∀ A ⊃ B. Then, since both premisses of the rule are valid (hypothesis) it holds that
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2) M ρ,σ a ∃ A and 3) M 2ρ,σ x i B|A, i.e. 4) for all c ∈ Ii(ρ(x)), c ∀ ¬A or
c ∃ ¬(A ⊃ B). Now, 2) and 3) cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Suppose 2) holds;
then the first term of the disjunction of 1) is not satisfied, and the second term must
hold, i.e. there exists c ∈ Ii(x) such that c ∃ A and c ∀ A ⊃ B. But these conditions
are in contradiction with 4). A similar reasoning applies if 2) holds. Thus, one of the
premisses is not valid, against the hypothesis.
4.1 Termination
We now show that, by adopting a suitable proof search strategy, the calculus yields a
decision procedure for CDL. Thus, in the following we consider only derivations whose
root formula is a (labelled) formula of CDL. We also prove the completeness of the
calculus under the same strategy. The adoption of a proof search strategy is not strictly
necessary for completeness, but it ensures that we can extract a finite countermodel from
an open or failed derivation branch. Although the termination proof has some similarity
with the one in Negri and Olivetti (2015), for G3CDL it is more difficult because of the
additional semantic rules.
As often happens with labelled calculi, the calculus G3CDL in itself is non-terminating
in the sense that a root-first (i.e. upwards) construction of a derivation may generate
infinite branches. Here below is an example (in which we omit writing the derivable left
premisses of LB):
...
c ∈ Ii(x), c ∃ A, c ∀ A ⊃ B...x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x i C|A
x i B|A, b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ B, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x i C|A
LC
b ∈ Ii(x), b ∃ A, b ∀ A ⊃ B, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x i C|A
LB
x i B|A, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x i C|A
LC
a ∈ Ii(x), a ∃ A, x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x i C|A
LB
x : Beli(B|A)⇒ x : Beli(C|A) RB
The loop is generated by the application of rules (LB) and (LC). Our aim is to specify
a strategy that ensures termination by preventing any kind of loop. The main point is
to avoid redundant (backwards) applications of rules. To specify this notion we need to
define saturation conditions associated to each rule.
Definition 4.2. Given a derivation branch B of the form Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, ...,Γk ⇒ ∆k,Γk+1 ⇒
∆k+1, ... where Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 is a sequent of the form ⇒ x0 : A, let ↓ Γk/ ↓ ∆k denote the
union of the antecedents/succedents that occur in the branch from the root Γ0 ⇒ ∆0
up to Γk ⇒ ∆k.
We say that a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ satisfies the saturation condition for a rule R if,
whenever Γ ⇒ ∆ contains the principal formulas in the conclusion of R, then it also
contains the formulas introduced by one of the premisses of R. The saturation conditions
for the rules of G3CDL are detailed below (the saturation conditions associated to
propositional rules are standard and can be found in Negri and Olivetti, 2015).
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(L∧) If x : A ∧B ∈ Γ, then x : A ∈↓ Γ and x : B ∈↓ Γ;
(Rf) If a is in Γ, ∆ then a ⊆ a is in Γ;
(Tr) If a ⊆ b and b ⊆ c are in Γ, then a ⊆ c is in Γ;
(L ⊆) If x ∈ a and a ⊆ b are in Γ, then x ∈ b is in Γ;
(R ∀) If a ∀ A is in ↓ ∆, then for some x there is x ∈ a in Γ and x : A in ↓ ∆;
(L ∀) If x ∈ a and a ∀ A are in Γ, then x : A is in ↓ Γ;
(R ∃) If x ∈ a is in Γ and a ∃ A is in ∆, then x : A is in ↓ ∆;
(L ∃) If a ∃ A is in ↓ Γ, then for some x there is x ∈ a in Γ and x : A is in ↓ Γ;
(RB) If x : Beli(B|A) is in ↓ ∆, then for some a, a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ, a ∃ A is in ↓ Γ and
x i B|A is in ↓ ∆;
(LB) If a ∈ Ii(x) and x : Beli(B|A) are in Γ, then either a ∃ A is in ↓ ∆ or x i B|A
is in ↓ Γ;
(RC) If a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ and x i B|A is in ∆, then either a ∃ A or a ∀ A ⊃ B are
in ↓ ∆;
(LC) If x i B|A is in ↓ Γ, then for some a, a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ, a ∃ A and a ∀ A ⊃ B
are in ↓ Γ;
(S) If a ∈ Ii(x) and b ∈ Ii(x) are in Γ, then a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a are in Γ;
(T) For all x occurring in ↓ Γ∪ ↓ ∆, for all i ∈ A there is an a such that a ∈ Ii(x) and
x ∈ a are in Γ;
(A) If a ∈ Ii(x) and y ∈ a are in Γ, then if b ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ also b ∈ Ii(y) is in Γ; if
b ∈ Ii(y) is in Γ also b ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ.
Furthermore, Γ⇒ ∆ is saturated if
(Init) There is no x : P in Γ ∩∆;
(L⊥) there is no x : ⊥ in Γ;
Γ⇒ ∆ satisfies all saturation conditions.
To analyse the interdependences between labels in a sequent we introduce the following:
Definition 4.3. Given a branch B as in Definition 4.2, let a be neighbourhood label
and x, y be world labels all occurring in ↓ Γk, we define:
• k(x) = min{t | x occurs in Γt}; k(a) = min{t | a occurs in Γt};
• x→g a (read “x generates a”) if for some t ≤ k and i ∈ A, k(a) = t and a ∈ Ii(x)
occurs in Γt.
• a →g x (read “a generates x”) if for some t ≤ k and i ∈ A, k(x) = t and x ∈ a
occurs in Γt.
• x w→ y (read “x generates y”) if for some a it holds that x→g a and a→g y.
Lemma 4.2. Given a branch B as in Definition 4.2, the following hold:
(a) The relation
w→ is acyclic and forms a tree with root x0;
(b) All world labels occurring in B are nodes of the tree, that is letting w→∗ be the
transitive closure of
w→, if u occurs in ↓ Γk, then x0 w→∗ u.
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Proof. (a) immediately follows from the definition of relation →g and from the sequent
calculus rules. As for (b), it is easily proved by induction on k(u) 6 k. If k(u) = 0, then
u = x0 and (b) trivially holds. If k(u) = t > 0, u does not occur in Γt−1 and u occurs in
Γt. This means that there exists a v and there exists a b such that b ∈ Ii(v) occurs in
Γt−1, and that u ∈ b occurs in Γt; thus, k(v) < k(u). By inductive hypothesis, x0 w→∗ v;
since v
w→ u, also x0 w→∗ u holds.
We can now define the proof-search strategy. A rule R is said to be applicable to a world
label x if R is applicable to a labelled formula with label x occurring in the conclusion
of a rule. In case of rules A1 and A2 of local absoluteness, we say the rules are applied
to x (rather than to y).
Definition 4.4. When constructing root-first a derivation tree for a sequent ⇒ x0 : A,
apply the following strategy:
(i) No rule can be applied to an initial sequent;
(ii) If k(x) < k(y) all rules applicable to x are applied before any rule applicable to y.
(iii) Rule T is applied as the first one to each world label x.
(iv) Rules which do not introduce a new label (static rules) are applied before the rules
which do introduce new labels (dynamic rules), with the exception of T , as in the
previous item;
(v) For each x, y and a, static rules A1 and A2 are applied before any other static rule;
(vi) A rule R cannot be applied to a sequent Γi ⇒ ∆i if ↓ Γi and / or ↓ ∆i satisfy the
saturation condition associated to R.
It follows from the strategy that if x
w→ y, every rule applicable to x is applied before
every rule applicable to y. Moreover, in the previous example, the loop would have
been stopped at the second application root-first of LB, because the application of LB
would violate condition (vi): the branch already satisfies the saturation condition for
LB, because x i B|A is already in ↓ Γ.
As usual, the size of a formula A, denoted by |A|, is the number of symbols that occur
in A. The size of a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is the sum of all the sizes of the formulas that occur
in it.
Lemma 4.3. Given a branch B as in Definition 4.2 and a world label x, we define
N(x) = {a | x →g a} as the set of neighbourhood labels generated by x, and W (x) =
{y | x w→ y} as the set of world labels generated by x. The size of N(x) and W (x) is
finite, more precisely: |N(x)| = O(n) and |W (x)| = O(n2).
Proof. We first prove that |N(x)| = O(n). By definition, a ∈ N(x) iff x →g a, i.e. if
there exists t 6 k and there exists i ∈ A such that a does not occur in Γs for all s 6 t
and a ∈ Ii(x) belongs to Γt. This means that label a has been introduced either by
(RB) or by (LC). Therefore x may create as many neighbourhood labels a as there are
formulas x : Beli(B|C) occurring in ↓ Γk∪ ↓ ∆k (plus one neighbourhood introduced by
T ) and the number of these formulas is O(n).
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We now prove |W (x)| = O(n2). By definition y ∈ W (x) iff x w→ y, i.e. iff for some
b it holds that x →g b and b →g y. We have just shown that for each x, the number of
neighbourhood labels generated by x is O(n). Let us consider b →g y. By definition,
this means that there exists t < k, and there exists an i ∈ A, such that y does not occur
in Γs for s 6 t and y ∈ b occurs in Γt+1. There are several ways in which a formula y ∈ b
can be introduced:
Case 1. The formula y ∈ b is introduced by a formula b ∃ C that belongs to
↓ Γk by application of rule L ∃. There are two subcases, according to how formula
b ∃ C has been derived: (a) b ∃ C has been introduced by (RB) applied to a formula
x : Beli(D|C) that belongs to ↓ ∆k and (b) b ∃ C has been introduced by (LC) applied
to a formula x i D|C that belongs to ↓ Γk. In turn, this formula has been introduced
by LB applied to a formula x : Beli(D|C) that belongs to ↓ Γk. In case (a), we notice
again that (RB) can be applied only once to each formula x : Beli(D|C) that occurs in
the consequent, and it generates exactly one new neighbourhood label b and one formula
b ∃ C. Similarly in case (b) (LC) can be applied only once to x i D|C and generates
one new neighbourhood label b and one formula b ∃ C. By the saturation condition,
each formula x i D|C in turn is introduced by (LB) applied only once to one formula
x : Beli(D|C) that occurs in ↓ Γk. Now each rule L ∃ generates exactly one new world
label for each b ∃ C that occurs in ↓ Γk and, as we have just shown the number of
such formulas is bounded by the number of formulas of type x : Beli(D|C) that occur
in ↓ Γk, and this number is is O(n). Therefore we can conclude that the number of new
world labels introduced in this case is O(n).
Case 2. The formula y ∈ b is introduced by a formula b ∀ C that belongs to
↓ ∆k by application of rule R ∀. But a formula b ∀ C may be introduced only by an
application of (RC) to a formula u i F |E, where C = E ⊃ F ∈↓ ∆k. In turn, a formula
of type u i F |E may be introduced only by an application of RB. Let us consider the
set Sb of formulas C such that Sb = {C | b ∀ C belongs to ↓ ∆k}. It holds that:
Sb = {C | b ∀ C belongs to ↓ ∆k}
= {E ⊃ F | ∃u∃i . u i F |E belongs to ↓ ∆k}
= {E ⊃ F | ∃u∃i . u : Beli(F |E) belongs to ↓ ∆k}
The cardinality of Sb is the same as the cardinality of the set {E ⊃ F | ∃u∃i . u :
Beli(F |E) belongs to ↓ ∆k}; thus, for each b ∈W (x), |Sb| = O(n). In the present case,
each b ∈W (x) generates O(n) labels.
Then, since |N(x)| = O(n) we finally get that |W (x)| = O(n2).
Proposition 4.4. Any derivation branch B = Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, ...,Γk ⇒ ∆k,Γk+1 ⇒ ∆k+1, ...
of a derivation starting from Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 ≡ ⇒ x0 : A0 built in accordance with the strategy
is finite.
Proof. Let us consider a branch B, and suppose by contradiction that B is not finite.
Let Γ∗ =
⋃
k Γk and ∆
∗ =
⋃
k ∆k; then, Γ
∗ is infinite. All labelled formulas in Γ∗
are subformulas of A0; however, the subformulas of A0 are finitely many (namely they
are O(n), where n is the length of A0); thus Γ
∗ must contain infinitely many labels.
By Lemma 4.3, Γ∗ must contain infinitely many world labels, since each world label
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x generates only O(n) neighbourhood labels. Let us consider now the tree determined
by the relation
w→∗ with root x0. By Lemma 4.2, each label in any Γk occurs in the
tree, which therefore is infinite. By Lemma 4.3, every label in the tree has O(n2)
successors, thus a finite number. By Ko¨nig’s lemma, the tree must contain an infinite
path: x0
w→ x1 w→ . . . w→ xt w→ xt+1 . . ., with all xt being different. We observe that
(a) infinitely many xt must be generated by dynamic rules applied to subformulas of
A0, but (b) these formulas are finitely many, thus there must be a subformula of A0
which is used infinitely many times to “generate” world labels (or better to generate a
neighbourhood label from which a further world label is generated).
There are two cases: this subformula is of type Beli(D|C) and occurs in ∆∗ or it is
of type i B|A and occurs in Γ∗ (in this latter case it is not properly a subformulas of
A0 but it is derived form a subformula of A0).
In the first case, for some xt we have that xt : Beli(D|C) occurs in some ∆s(xt);
furthermore, for some a such that k(a) = s(xt) + 1, we have that a ∈ Ii(xt), a ∃ C ∈
Γs(xt)+1 and xt i D|C ∈ ∆s(xt)+1. Moreover, we have a →g xt+1. There must be in
the sequence an xr with r > t, such that xr : Beli(D|C) occurs in some ∆s(xr) and for
a new b, that is with k(b) = s(xr) + 1, we have that (∗) b ∈ Ii(xr), b ∃ C belongs to
Γs(xr)+1, xr i D|C occurs in ∆s(xr)+1 and b→g xt+1. By the definition of the strategy,
we have that a ∈ Ii(xr), thus a itself fulfils the saturation condition for (RB) applied
to xr : Beli(D|C) belongs to ∆s(xr). Thus, step (∗) violates the strategy and we get a
contradiction.
The second case displays a similar situation: for some t, xt i D|C occurs in some
Γs(xt) and for a new a, with k(a) = s(xt) + 1, we have that a ∈ Ii(xt), a ∃ C occurs
in Γs(xt)+1 and a ∀ C ⊃ D occurs in Γs(xt)+1. Moreover, we have that a →g xt+1.
Similarly there must be an xr in the sequence with r > t, such that xr i D|C occurs
in some Γs(xr) and for a new b, with k(b) = s(xr) + 1, we have that we have that (∗∗)
b ∈ Ii(xr), b ∃ C occurs in Γs(xr)+1 and b ∀ C ⊃ D occurs in Γs(xr)+1. By definition
of the strategy we have that a ∈ Ii(xr), thus a itself fulfils the saturation condition for
LC applied to xr i D|C occurring in Γs(xr). Step (∗∗) violates the strategy, and we get
a contradiction.
The previous proof actually shows something stronger than termination of each deriva-
tion branch. The proof demonstrates that a formula of type Beli(B|A) or x i B|A
cannot be used twice to generate two world labels that occur in the same path of the
label tree associated to the derivation. Therefore, given an initial formula A0, the num-
ber of formulas of type Beli(B|A) or x i B|A that can be generated in the derivation
of ⇒ x : A0 is bounded by O(n), with n length of A0. As a consequence, we have the
following:
Fact 4.1. The height of each branch of a derivation defined as described in Proposition
4.4 is is bounded by O(n); thus, the height of the derivation is bounded by O(n), where
n is the length of A0.
Termination of proof search under the strategy is now an obvious consequence:
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Theorem 4.5. Proof search built in accordance with the strategy for any sequent of the
form ⇒ x0 : A0 always comes to an end after a finite number of steps. More precisely,
the maximal size of each sequent is O(n4n+2), and the maximal length of a derivation
branch is bounded by O(n2n+1 · n4n+2) = O(n6n+3).
Furthermore, each sequent that occurs as a leaf of the derivation tree is either an initial
sequent or a saturated sequent.
Proof. Consider a branch of a derivation tree whose root is the sequent ⇒ x0 : A0, and
build the finite tree structure with all the labels that occur in the derivation. The root
of the tree will be the label x0, and all the other labels that occur in ↓ Γk will occur as
nodes in the tree. As above, n = |A0|.
By Proposition 4.1 we have that the height of the label tree associated with the
derivation is bounded by O(n).
Then, by Lemma 4.3 we have that the number of world labels and of neighbourhood
labels that can be generated from each node is finite, and it is bounded by n2, i.e. it is
O(n2).
Let us consider a derivation tree with root ⇒ x0 : A0. The number of world labels
that occur in each branch ↓ Γk is bounded by O(n2n). The number of neighbourhood
labels occurring in ↓ Γk is bounded by the number of world labels multiplied by the
maximal number of labels generated by each world, that is at most n. Thus, the number
of neighbourhood labels is bounded by O(n2n · n) = O(n2n+1).
The maximal size of each sequent occurring in the derivation is given by the maximal
number of labelled formulas multiplied by the maximal number of subformulas of A0,
which is bounded by n: thus, O(n2n+1 · n) = O(n2n+2). However, this measure is not
sufficient, since it takes into account only formulas of the form x : F , a Q F or x i F |G.
We have to calculate also the number of formulas of the form y ∈ b and b ∈ Ii(x) which
could have been introduced in the derivation by (L⊆) or T . The cardinality of the set
{(y ∈ b) | y, b occurs in ↓ Γk} is given by n2n+1 · n2n+1 = n4n+2. Thus, the maximal
size of the sequents is bounded by O(n4n+2).
Finally, the maximal length of each derivation branch is calculated by taking into
account the maximal size of the sequents and the maximal number of rules which can
be applied to it. We have to distinguish between rules which can be applied more than
once (rules L ∀, R ∃, RC and LB ) and rules which can be applied only once (all the
others). The rules which can be applied more than once can be applied as many times as
the number of labels occurring in the sequent, i.e. O(n2n+1). Thus, the maximal length
of a derivation branch is bounded by O(n2n+1 · n4n+2) = O(n6n+3).
To prove the second part of the theorem, consider a branch Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, ...,Γn ⇒ ∆n.
As we have just proved, every branch of a derivation tree is finite. The leaf of the branch
will be the sequent Γn ⇒ ∆n, and no rule is applicable to it; thus, trivially, the sequent
is either an initial sequent or it is saturated.
From the proof of Theorem 4.5 we have the following:
Proposition 4.6. The validity of a formula A in CDL can be decided in NEXPTIME .
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We know that multi-agent S5 is a fragment of CDL. By the result in Halpern and
Friedman (1994) we immediately obtain that PSPACE is the lower bound for deciding
validity of a CDL formula. We conjecture that PSPACE is also the upper bound for
the logic; this problem will be considered in further research.
4.2 Completeness
We show that the calculus is complete under the terminating strategy of Definition 4.4.
Theorem 4.7. Let Γ⇒ ∆ be the upper sequent of a saturated branch B in a derivation
tree. Then there exists a finite countermodel M to Γ⇒ ∆.
Proof. Let Γ ⇒ ∆ be the upper sequent of a saturated branch B. By theorem 4.5, B
is finite. We construct a model MB and an SNB-realization (ρ, σ), and show that the
model satisfies all formulas in ↓ Γ and falsifies all formulas in ↓ ∆. Let
SB = {x |x ∈ (↓ Γ∪ ↓ ∆)} and NB = {a | a ∈ (↓ Γ∪ ↓ ∆).}
Then, associate to each a ∈ NB a neighbourhood αa, such that αa = {y ∈ SB | y ∈
a belongs to Γ}, thus αa ⊆ SB. We define a neighbourhood modelMB = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K〉
as
• W = SB, i.e. the set W consists of all the labels occurring in the saturated branch
B;
• For each x ∈W , Ii(x) = {αa | a ∈ Ii(x) belongs to ↓ Γ};
• For P atomic, JP K = {x ∈W |x : P belongs to ↓ Γ}.
We first show that:
(∗) If a ⊆ b belongs to Γ, then αa ⊆ αb.
To this aim, suppose y ∈ αa. This means that y ∈ a belongs to Γ; then, by the saturation
condition L ⊆ also y ∈ b belongs to Γ. By definition of the model we have y ∈ αb, and
thus that αa ⊆ αb.
We now show thatMB = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K〉 satisfies the properties of a multi-agent neigh-
bourhood model, namely non-emptiness (trivial), total reflexivity, nesting and local ab-
soluteness. Strong closure under intersection follows from finiteness, cf. the end of this
section.
Total reflexivity: According to the saturation condition T , for every x that occurs
in ↓ Γ∪ ↓ ∆ also a ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ a occur in Γ; then, by definition of MB, αa ∈ Ii(x) and
x ∈ αa.
Nesting: Suppose αa ∈ Ii(x) and αb ∈ Ii(x). We want to to show that αa ⊆ αb or
αb ⊆ αa. By definition of the model, from αa ∈ Ii(x) and αb ∈ Ii(x) it follows that
a ∈ Ii(x) and b ∈ Ii(x) both belong to Γ. From the saturation condition S, we have that
a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a belong to Γ and we conclude by the fact (∗) above.
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Local absoluteness: Suppose αa ∈ Ii(x) and y ∈ αa. We want to show that Ii(x) =
Ii(y). Suppose αb ∈ Ii(x); by definition of the model we have that a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a
and b ∈ Ii(x) all belong to Γ. By the saturation condition A, also b ∈ Ii(y) belongs
to Γ; thus, by definition, αb ∈ Ii(y) holds. For the opposite inclusion apply the same
reasoning, exploiting the second condition of the saturation condition A.
Next, define a realization (ρ, σ) such that ρ(x) = x and σ(a) = αa. We now prove
the following, where F denotes any formula of the language, i.e. F is a ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ A,
a ⊆ b, x ∀ A, x ∃ A, x i B|A, x : A, x : Beli(B|A):
[Claim 1] If F is in ↓ Γ, then MB  F ;
[Claim 2] If F is in ↓ ∆, then MB 2 F ;
The two claims are proved by cases, by induction on the weight of the formula F .
[a] If A is a formula of the form a ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ a or a ⊆ b, Claim 1. holds by definition
of MB, and Claim 2. is empty. For the case of a ⊆ b, employ the fact (∗) above.
[b] If A is a labelled atomic formula x : P , the claim holds by definition of the model;
by the saturation condition (Init) no inconsistencies arise. If A ≡ ⊥, it is not forced
in any model so Claim 2 holds; instead Claim 1 holds by the saturation clause L⊥. If
A is a conjunction, disjunction or implication, both claims hold for the corresponding
saturation conditions and by inductive hypothesis on formulas on smaller weight.
[c] If A ≡ a ∃ A is in ↓ Γ, then by the saturation clause L ∃ for some x there are
x ∈ a, x : A are in ↓ Γ. By definition of the model MB, for some x, x ∈ αa. Then,
since w(x : A) < w(a ∃ A), apply the inductive hypothesis and obtain MB  x : A.
Therefore, by definition of satisfiability, MB  αa ∃ A.
If a ∃ A is in ↓ ∆, then it is also in ∆. Consider an arbitrary world x in αa. By
definition of MB we have that x ∈ a is in Γ; we apply the saturation condition R ∀
and obtain that x : A is in ↓ ∆. By inductive hypothesis we have that MB 2 x : A;
thus, since this line of reasoning holds for arbitrary x, we can conclude by definition of
satisfiability that MB 2 αa ∃ A.
The case in which A ≡ a ∀ A is similar.
[d] If x i B|A is in ↓ Γ, then by the saturation condition LC for some i, a it holds
that a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ, and a ∃ A, a ∀ A ⊃ B are in ↓ Γ. By inductive hypothesis,
MB  αa ∃ A, and MB  αa ∀ A ⊃ B. By definition, this yields MB  x i B|A.
If x i B|A is in ↓ ∆, consider an arbitrary neighbourhood γc in Ii(x). Then by definition
ofMB we have that c ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ; apply the saturation condition RC and obtain that
either c ∃ A or c ∀ A ⊃ B is in ↓ ∆. By inductive hypothesis, either M 2 γc ∃ A or
MB 2 γc ∀ A ⊃ B. In both cases, by definition MB 2 x i B|A.
[e] If x : Beli(B|A) is in ↓ Γ, then it is also in Γ. Consider an arbitrary neighbourhood
αa in Ii(x). By definition of MB we have that a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ; apply the saturation
condition LB and conclude that either a ∃ A is in ↓ ∆, or x i B|A is in ↓ Γ. By
inductive hypothesis, it holds that either MB 2 αa ∃ A or MB  x i B|A. In both
cases, by definition MB  x : Beli(B|A).
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If x : Beli(B|A) is in ↓ ∆, by the saturation condition RB for some i, a it holds that
a ∈ Ii(x) is in Γ, a ∃ A is in ↓ Γ and x i B|A is in ↓ ∆. By inductive hypothesis,
MB  αa ∃ A and MB 2 x i B|A, thus, by definition, we have MB 2 x : Beli(B|A).
The completeness of the calculus is an obvious consequence:
Theorem 4.8. If A is valid then it is provable in G3CDL.
Theorem 4.7 together with the soundness of G3CDL provides a constructive proof of
the finite model property of CDL: if A is satisfiable in a model (i.e. ¬A is not valid),
then, by the soundness of G3CDL ¬A is not provable, thus by Theorem 4.7 we can
build a finite countermodel that falsifies ¬A, i.e. which satisfies A.
5 Relating the old and the new
In this section we recall the semantics of plausibility models, an earlier semantics for
CDL described in the literature. We shall relate this semantics to the neighbourhood
semantics we have formerly introduced and prove that the two systems are equivalent,
i.e. that they validate exactly the same formulas. Observe that this result provides an
alternative (indirect) proof of soundness and completeness of the axiomatization of CDL
with respect to plausibility models.
5.1 The semantics of plausibility models
Epistemic plausibility models are versatile structures that have been used in a variety of
different contexts by logicians, game theorists, and computer scientists, as emphasised
in the recent survey article by Pacuit (2013). Epistemic plausibility models, here called
P -models for short, also come with different names depending on the context of inquiry:
Board (2004), for instance, calls them Belief Revision Structures.
Epistemic plausibility models are Kripke structures that display for each agent both
an equivalence relation over worlds, defining knowledge (as in standard epistemic models)
and a plausibility relation, which is used to define beliefs. The intuition is that an agent’s
beliefs are the propositions that hold in the worlds (state of affairs, scenarios) that the
agent considers the most plausible.
We recall a few preliminary notions. A pre-order  over a set W is a reflexive and
transitive relation over W . Given S ⊆ W ,  is connected over S if for all x, y ∈ S
either x  y or y  x. An infinite descending -chain over W is a sequence {xn}n≥0
of elements of W such that for all n, xn+1  xn but xn 6 xn+1. We say that  is
well-founded over W if there are no infinite descending -chains over W . Given S ⊆W ,
let Min(S) ≡ {u ∈ S | ∀z ∈ S . z  u→ u  z}. Observe that whenever  is connected
over S the definition Min(S) can be simplified to Min(S) = {u ∈ S | ∀z ∈ S . u  z}.
Finally, the well-foundedness property can be equivalently stated as: for each S ⊆W if
S 6= ∅ then Min(S) 6= ∅.
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Definition 5.1. Let A be a set of agents; an epistemic plausibility model
M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, {i}i∈A, J K〉
consists of a nonempty set W of elements called “worlds”or “states”; for each i ∈ A,
an equivalence relation ∼i over W (with [x]∼i ≡ {w | w ∼i x}); for each i ∈ A, a well-
founded pre-order i over W ; a valuation function J K : Atm→ P(W ). The preorder i
satisfies the following properties:
• Plausibility implies possibility : If w i v then w ∼i v.
• Local connectedness: If w ∼i v then w i v or v i w (in other words, i is
connected over every equivalence class of ∼i).
The truth conditions for Boolean combinations of formulas are the standard ones; the
truth condition for the conditional belief operator is the following:
JBeli(B|A)K ≡ {x ∈W |Mini([x]∼i ∩ JAK) ⊆ JBK}
A formula A is valid in a model M if JAK = W and that A is valid in the class of
epistemic plausibility models if A is valid in every epistemic plausibility model.
The following proposition, proved by unfolding the definitions, gives an equivalent for-
mulation of the truth condition of the conditional operator Beli given in Section 2.2.
From now on, we shall use this formulation.
Proposition 5.1. Given any P -modelM = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, {i}i∈A, J K〉, with x ∈W we
have that M, x  Beli(B|A) iff:
(∀y . y ∼i x → y  ¬A) or (∃y ∼i x . y  A and (∀z . z i y → z  A ⊃ B))
Proof. (Only if) Assume M, x  Beli(B|A), that is, Mini([x]∼i ∩ [A]) ⊆ [B]. Now, it
is either true or false that for all y, y ∼i x implies y  ¬A: if it is true, we immediately
get the result. Else, for some y, y ∼i x and y  A. Hence SA ≡ Mini({w | w ∼i x,w 
A}) 6= ∅ from the well-foundedness of i. Given any z ∈ SA, given any world y such
that y ∼i x and y  A, we have z i y since i is a total preordering. Hence z  B
from our initial assumption, so that z  A ⊃ B.
(If) Assume that for all y, y ∼i x implies y  ¬A or there is y ∼i x such that y  A
and ∀z, z i y implies z  A ⊃ B. If the first disjunct holds, then SA is empty, which
makes the (If)-direction trivially true. If the second disjunct holds, then there is some
y with y ∼i x such that y  A (i.e. SA is nonempty) and ∀z, z i y implies z  A ⊃ B.
Let w ∈ SA. We then have w i y and therefore w  A ⊃ B. Since w ∈ SA, we also
have w  A, so that w  B follows, hence the claim Mini([x]∼i ∩ [A]) ⊆ [B].
Observation 5.1. Recall the definitions of the operators of unconditional belief and
knowledge in terms of the conditional belief operator: BeliA =def Beli(A|>) andKiA =def
Beli(⊥|¬A). The truth conditions for these operators in plausibility models are the fol-
lowing:
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JBeliAK ≡ {x ∈W |Mini([x]∼i) ⊆ JAK}JKiAK ≡ {x ∈W | [x]∼i ⊆ JAK)}
By Proposition 5.1 it is possible to reformulate the above conditions as follows:
M, x  BeliA iff ∃y ∼i x . y  A and (∀z . z i y → z  A)
M, x  Ki(A) iff ∀y . y ∼i x → y  A
5.2 Equivalence between N- and P -models
We now show the equivalence between neighbourhood models, here called N -models,
and epistemic plausibility models (P -models). The proofs make use of the basic corre-
spondence between partial orders and topologies dating back to Alexandroff (1937) and
recalled in Marti and Pinosio (2013) and Pacuit (2017). However, the result must be
adapted to the present setting of multi-agent epistemic and neighbourhood models. The
equivalence (Theorem 5.4) is obtained from Theorems 5.2, 5.3 and 2.1. To prove these
results, we need to define a suitable measure of weight for CDL formulas (in Definition
3.1 we defined weight for G3CDL formulas).
Definition 5.2. The weight of a CDL formula is defined as follows: w(P ) = w(⊥) = 1;
w(A ◦B) = w(A) + w(B) + 1 for ◦ = {∧,∨,⊃}; w(Beli(B|A)) = w(A) + w(B) + 3.
Theorem 5.2. If a formula A is valid in the class P -models, then it is valid in the class
of multi-agent N -models.
Proof. Given a N -model MN we build an P -model MP and we show that for any
formula A, if A is valid in MP then A is valid in MN . Let MN = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K〉 be
a multi-agent N -model. We construct a P -model MP = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, {i}i∈A, J K〉, by
stipulating:
• x ∼i y iff ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . y ∈ α
• x i y iff ∀α ∈ Ii(y) . y ∈ α → x ∈ α.
We first show that ∼i is an equivalence relation.
• Reflexivity. By total reflexivity ∃α ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ α holds, thus x ∼i x.
• Symmetry. Suppose x ∼i y, this means ∃α ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ α; by local absoluteness we
get Ii(x) = Ii(y). By total reflexivity, ∃β ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ β, thus also β ∈ I(y), and
this shows y ∼i x.
• Transitivity. Suppose x ∼i y and y ∼i z, i.e., ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . y ∈ α and ∃β ∈ Ii(y) . z ∈
β; by local absoluteness of Ii we have Ii(x) = Ii(y); therefore ∃β ∈ Ii(x) . z ∈ β,
which means x ∼i z.
Next we prove that i such as constructed satisfies reflexivity, transitivity, plausibility
implies possibility, local connectedness, and well-foundedness:
• Reflexivity. Trivial since ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α→ x ∈ α.
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• Transitivity. Suppose x i y and y i z, we have 1) ∀α ∈ Ii(y) . y ∈ α → x ∈ α
and 2) ∀β ∈ Ii(z) . z ∈ β → y ∈ β. Let z ∈ β. Then, from 2) we have y ∈ β and
from 1) x ∈ β follows, i.e. ∀β ∈ Ii(z) . z ∈ α → x ∈ β holds. This means x i z.
• Local connectedness: by contradiction suppose that x ∼i y holds, but that neither
x i y nor y i x holds. By definition of i we have:
for some β ∈ Ii(y), y ∈ β and x /∈ β
for some γ ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ γ and y /∈ γ.
Since x ∼i y, by reflexivity ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . y ∈ α, whence by local absoluteness
Ii(y) = Ii(x). Thus both β, γ ∈ Ii(x) and by nesting β ⊆ γ or γ ⊆ β holds. If
the former holds we get y ∈ γ, if the latter holds x ∈ β, in both cases reaching a
contradiction.
• Plausibility implies possibility. Suppose x i y; by definition, it holds that ∀α ∈
Ii(y) if y ∈ α then x ∈ α. By total reflexivity, there exists β ∈ Ii(y) . y ∈ β, thus
we get x ∈ β. Therefore we have ∃β ∈ Ii(y) . x ∈ β, which means y ∼i x, whence
x ∼i y by symmetry.
• Well-foundedness. If MN is finite there is nothing to prove. Suppose then that
MN is infinite. Suppose by contradiction that there is an infinite descending chain
{zk}k≥0, i.e. such that for all k:
zk+1 i zk and zk 6i zk+1
Observe that by definition of i, plausibility implies possibility, and local abso-
luteness we obtain that for all k, h ≥ 0, it holds that Ii(zk) = Ii(zh) = . . . = Ii(z0).
Thus by definition of i, since for all k ≥ 0 . zk 6i zk+1, we get that for all
zk ∈ {zk}k≥0 there exists βzk+1 ∈ Ii(z0) such that:
(∗) zk+1 ∈ βzk+1 and zk 6∈ βzk+1 .
Consider the set T = {βzk+1 | zk ∈ {zk}k≥0}. T is nonempty; thus by strong closure
under intersection it follows that that
⋂
T ∈ T , and also ⋂T 6= ∅. Obviously, we
have that
(∗∗) for all β ∈ T , ⋂T ⊆ β.
Since
⋂
T ∈ T , we have ⋂T = βzt+1 for some zt ∈ {zk}k≥0. By using (∗) twice
(namely for zt+1 and for zt+2) we have zt+1 ∈ βzt+1 and zt+1 6∈ βzt+2 , thus
⋂
T =
βzt+1 6⊆ βzt+2 against (∗∗).
We now prove that for any x ∈W and formula A
(a) MN , x  A iff MP , x  A
We proceed by induction on the structure of A. The base case (A atomic) holds by
definition, as J K is the same in the two models. For the propositional cases A =
B ∧ C,B ∨ C,B ⊃ C, statement (a) easily follows by inductive hypothesis. We only
consider the case A = Beli(C|B). To simplify the notation we write u P B instead of
MP , u  B and u N B instead of MN , u  B.
[⇒] Suppose that x N Beli(C|B). This means that:
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(∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬B) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ and β ∀ B ⊃ C).
We consider the two cases separately. Suppose first that ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬B holds;
we show that for all y y ∼i x implies y P ¬B. Let y ∼i x; then, by definition,
∃α ∈ Ii(x) . y ∈ α; since α ∀ ¬B we get y N ¬B, and thus by inductive hypothesis
y P ¬B holds.
Suppose now that ∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ B and β ∀ B ⊃ C hold. We prove that
∃w .w ∼i x and w P B, and that ∀z . z i w → z P B ⊃ C. The hypothesis gives
in particular that ∃β ∈ Ii(x) such that β ∃ B, whence ∃w ∈ βw such that w N B.
Thus, x ∼i w and by inductive hypothesis also w P B. Now let z i w. By definition
this means that ∀γ ∈ I(w) . w ∈ γ → z ∈ γ. Therefore, since w ∈ β, also z ∈ β. From
β ∀ B ⊃ C we get z N B ⊃ C, whence also z P B ⊃ C by inductive hypothesis.
[⇐] Suppose that x P Beli(C|B) holds. This means that:
(∀y . y ∼i x→ y P ¬B) or
(∃w .w ∼i x and w P B and (∀z . z i w → z P B ⊃ C)).
As above, there are two cases to consider. Suppose first that ∀y . y ∼i x → y P ¬B.
Let α ∈ I(x) and u ∈ α. By definition u ∼i x, thus by hypothesis u P ¬B and by
inductive hypothesis u N ¬B. This means that α ∀ ¬B (first case of truth definition
of Beli in neighbourhood models).
Suppose now that there exists w such that w ∼i x and w P B and for all z
z i w implies z P B ⊃ C. From w ∼i x (hypothesis) it follows by definition
that ∃α ∈ I(x) . w ∈ α. By local absoluteness, I(x) = I(w). Now consider the set
S = {β ∈ I(x) |w ∈ β}. It holds that α ∈ S, and that S 6= ∅. Let γ = ∩S. By strong
closure under intersection, γ ∈ S ⊆ Ii(x), thus γ ∈ Ii(x). But w ∈ γ and since we have
w P B, we also have w N B by inductive hypothesis. We have obtained that γ ∃ B.
We still have to prove that γ ∀ B ⊃ C. Let u ∈ γ; let us prove that u i w and
u N B ⊃ C. We first show that u i w. To this purpose, let δ ∈ I(w) with w ∈ δ (by
definition of i), and we prove that u ∈ δ: since I(x) = I(w), also δ ∈ I(x), whence
δ ∈ S and γ ⊆ δ; therefore u ∈ δ, and u i w. Since u i w by hypothesis we have
u P B ⊃ C and by inductive hypothesis u N B ⊃ C. Thus, γ ∀ B ⊃ C.
(End of the proof). Suppose that A is valid in MP . Thus for all w ∈ W , we have
w P A, and by (a) we have also w N A for all w ∈W , which means that A is valid in
MN . So we proved that if A is valid in MP then A is also valid in MN . Finally, given
a N -model MN , we build an P -model MP as above. By the proof given above, if A is
valid in MP , A is valid in MN . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5.3. If a formula A is valid in the class of multi-agent N -models, then it is
valid in the class of P -models.
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Proof. Given a P -model MP we build an N -model MN and we show that for any
formula A, if A is valid in MN then A is valid in MP . The result easily follows from
this fact.
Let MP = 〈W, {∼i}i∈A, {i}i∈A, J K〉 be an P -model. We build a N -model MN as
follows. Let u ∈ W , and define its downward closed set ↓i u according to i as
↓i u = {v ∈ W | v i u} Now we define the model MN = 〈W, {I}i∈A, J K 〉, where for
any x ∈W
Ii(x) = {↓i u |u ∼i x}
We first show that MN is indeed a N -model.
• Non-emptiness: Let α ∈ Ii(x), then α =↓i u for some u ∼i x and since u ∈↓i u,
we have α 6= ∅.
• Nesting: Let α, β ∈ Ii(x). Then, α =↓i u for some u ∼i x and β =↓i v for some
v ∼i x. We can conclude u ∼i v, and by local connectedness we have u i v or
v i u. It is immediate to see that this entails ↓i u ⊆↓i v or ↓i v ⊆↓i u, from
which the result follows.
• Total reflexivity: Obvious since x ∈↓i x.
• Local absoluteness: We first prove the following fact: if y ∼i x then Ii(y) = Ii(x).
Let y ∼i x and ↓i z ∈ Ii(y), then z ∼i y, so that by transitivity z ∼i x, thus
↓i z ∈ Ii(x) and hence Ii(y) ⊆ Ii(x). The opposite inclusion Ii(x) ⊆ Ii(y) is
proved in the same way. As for local absoluteness: suppose α ∈ Ii(x) and y ∈ α.
This means that α =↓i u for some u ∼i x; since y ∈↓i u, we have y i u and
by plausibility implies possibility y ∼i u and therefore also y ∼i x. Then we apply
the above fact.
• Closure under intersection: In the finite case, this property immediately follows
from properties non-emptiness and nesting. IfMP is infinite, let S ⊆ Ii(x), S 6= ∅,
with S countable so that S = {αh |h > 0} where αh =↓i xh for xh ∼i x. We
prove that
(∗) ∃αh ∈ S such that ∀αk ∈ S . αh ⊆ αk
If (∗) holds then αh =
⋂
S and αh ∈ S and the proof is over. Suppose by
contradiction that (∗) does not hold. This means that: 1) ∀αh ∈ S ∃αk ∈ S . αh *
αk. Thus, by the property of spheres nesting 2) ∀αh ∈ S ∃αk ∈ S . αk ⊂ αh. From
2), by denumerable dependent choice, we can build an infinite (strictly decreasing)
chain of neighbourhoods
α1 ⊃ α2 ⊃ α3 ⊃ . . .
For every n ≥ 1 we have by definition that αn =↓i un. Let vn ∈ αn − αn+1,
vn+1 ∈ αn+1−αn+2, etc. We have vn+1 i un+1 by construction and it is enough to
prove that un+1 i vn to conclude by transitivity that vn+1 i vn. By construction,
we have vn i un+1 and therefore by local connectedness, un+1 i vn. Moreover by
vn i un+1 it also follows that vn i vn+1. We have thus an infinitely descending
i-chain of worlds {vn}n≥1, against the assumption of well-foundedness of W . We
reached a contradiction from the negation of (∗); therefore, (∗) holds.
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We now prove that for any x ∈W and formula A
(b) MP , x  A iff MN , x  A
We proceed by induction on the structure of A. Again, for the base case, A atomic it
holds by definition as J K is the same in the two models. For the propositional cases
A = B ∧ C,B ∨ C,B ⊃ C, statement (b) easily follows by inductive hypothesis. We
only consider the case A = Beli(C|B). As in previous theorem, we use the following
abbreviations: u P B instead of MP , u  B and u N B instead of MN , u  B.
[⇒] Suppose that x P Beli(C|B). This means that
(∀y . x ∼i y → y P ¬B) or (∃w .w ∼i x and w P B and (∀z . z i w → z  B ⊃P C))
Suppose first that ∀y . y ∼i x→ y P ¬B. Take any α ∈ Ii(x). By definition, α =↓i z,
for some z ∼i x. Let y ∈↓i z. Then by definition y i z and by plausibility implies
possibility, y ∼i z; thus by transitivity y ∼i x. By hypothesis we have y P ¬B, whence
by inductive hypothesis also y N ¬B. We showed α ∀ ¬B for any α ∈ Ii(x), thus
x N Beli(C|B) holds (first case of the truth condition).
Suppose now that there is a w ∼i x such that w P B and ∀z . z i w → z P B ⊃ C.
Let us consider α =↓i w. By inductive hypothesis w N B and since w ∈↓i w we
obtain α ∃ B. Now consider any u ∈ α =↓i w. By definition u i w. Thus by
hypothesis u P B ⊃ C, whence by inductive hypothesis also u N B ⊃ C. We showed
that α ∀ B ⊃ C.
[⇐] Suppose that x N Beli(C|B), this means that
(∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬B) or (∃β ∈ Ii(x) . β ∃ B E β ∀ B ⊃ C)
In first case ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ ¬B holds. Let y ∼i x, we want to show that y P ¬B.
Since y ∼i x, we have ↓i y ∈ Ii(x). Thus by hypothesis ↓i y ∀ ¬B and y N ¬B,
whence by inductive hypothesis also y P ¬B.
In the second case, there is β ∈ Ii(x) such that β ∃ B and β ∀ B ⊃ C. We prove
that for some u ∼i x we have u P B and for all v i u it holds v P B ⊃ C. By
definition β =↓i z for some z ∼i x. Since by hypothesis β ∃ B, there exists u ∈ β such
that u N B, whence also u P B by inductive hypothesis. By definition of β, we have
u i z and thus u ∼i x. Let now v i u. By transitivity v ∈ β, and since β ∀ B ⊃ C
we have v N B ⊃ C, whence also v P B ⊃ C by inductive hypothesis.
(End of the proof). We proved that if A is valid in MN then A is also valid in MP .
Suppose that A is valid in MN . Thus, for all w ∈ W , we have w N A, and by (b) we
have also w P A for all w ∈ W , which means that A is valid in MP . Finally, let A
be valid in the class of N -models. Then, A is also valid in the class of P -models. Given
a P -model MP , we build an N -model MN as above. By hypothesis A is valid in MN
and for what we have just shown A is valid in MP . This concludes the proof.
Putting the two previous theorems together and making use of Theorem 2.1 we finally
obtain the following:
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Theorem 5.4. A formula A is a theorem of CDL if and only if it is valid in the class of
plausibility models.
6 Other epistemic and doxastic modalities
Following Baltag and Smets (2008) and Pacuit (2013), we add to CDL the doxastic
operators of safe belief and strong belief. These operators can be defined both in terms
of epistemic plausibility models and in terms of neighbourhood models. Starting from
the neighbourhood models characterization, we give sequent calculus rules for these
operators and extend the sequent calculus G3CDL to cover these modalities. Similarly,
we define in both models a modal operator [>]i that expresses a strict order relation,
which in turn allows to define two additional modalities: weakly safe belief and the
operator of unary revision.
The safe belief operator captures the epistemic attitude corresponding to “Stalnaker’s
knowledge”: according to Stalnaker, knowledge is a doxastic attitude which remains
stable in front of belief revision with any true information (Baltag and Smets, 2008).
The view that in order to define (a strong notion of) knowledge the grounds for the
epistemic attitude should be conclusive, i.e. knowledge needs to be defined as stable
under the acquisition of further information, was made explicit already by Hintikka (p.
20–21, Hintikka, 1962) following Malcom (1952):
If someone says “I know that p” in this strong sense of knowledge, he im-
plicitly denies that any further information would have led him to alter his
view. He commits himself to the view that he would still persist in saying
that p is true (...) even if he knew more than he now knows.
Following Baltag and Smets (2008) we use the term “knowledge” for the modality Ki,
and call the present attitude of undefeasible knowledge “safe belief”. The intuitive
meaning of the safe belief operator BelSafei A is that agent i safely believes A if and only
if A is true, she believes A, and she continues to believe A whatever true information is
received.
In terms of epistemic plausibility models, the safe belief operator is defined as follows
(Baltag and Smets, 2008; Pacuit, 2013):
(SafeP ) MP , x  BelSafei A iff ∀y . y i x → MP , y  A
We give the following condition in terms of neighbourhood models:
(SafeN ) MN , x  BelSafei A iff ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α and α ∀ A
To prove that the two notions correspond to each other, we have to extend the inductive
proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 on the equivalence between epistemic plausibility models
and neighbourhood models. More precisely, we have to add a suitable inductive step
which takes into account also the strong belief operator. The key fact is expressed in
the next proposition.
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Proposition 6.1. The extension of preferential models by the truth condition for the
safe belief operator, SafeP , gives the same class of valid formulas as the extension of
neighbourhood models with condition SafeN .
Proof. LetMP be an epistemic plausibility model. We construct a neighbourhood model
as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. We now have to prove that
(a+) MP , x  BelSafei A iff MN , x  BelSafei A
from the assumption that JAKMN = JAKMP . In order to prove the left-to-right direction,
suppose MP , x  BelSafei A, i.e. ∀y . y i x implies y  A. This means that ∀y ∈↓ix
. y  A, i.e. ↓i x ∀ A. By construction we have ↓i x ∈ Ii(x), and therefore
∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α and α ∀ A, i.e. MN , x  BelSafei A. As for the other direction of
(a+), suppose that MN , x  BelSafei A. This means ∃x ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α and α ∀ A.
By construction, α =↓i z for some z, z ∼i x. Since x ∈ α, then x ∈↓i z. This
implies that ↓i x ⊆↓i z, and since ↓i z ∀ A, we have a fortiori ↓i x ∀ A, i.e.,
∀y . y i x → y  A.
For the other direction of the proposition, let MN be a neighbourhood model. We
construct from it a plausibility model MP following the procedure described in the
proof of Theorem 5.3. We now have to prove that
(b+) MN , x  BelSafei A iff MP , x  BelSafei A
assuming as hypothesis that JAKMN = JAKMP . For one direction, suppose thatMP , x 
BelSafei A. This means that ∀y(y i x → MP , y  A), i.e. from the definition of MP :
(hp1) (∀y∀β ∈ I(x) . x ∈ β → y ∈ β) → MN , y  A
We have to prove that (∗) ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α and α ∀ A. We proceed by absurdum,
assuming as hypothesis the negation of (∗):
(hp2) ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α → α 1∀ A
Let Σ = {α ∈ Ii(x) |x ∈ α} (i.e. Σ is the principal filter generated by x in Ii(x)). By
total reflexivity, we have that Σ 6= ∅. Let α∗ = ∩Σ. By the intersection property we
have that α∗ 6= ∅, and by strong intersection property we have that α∗ ∈ Ii(x) (and
that α∗ ∈ Σ as well). Thus we have that x ∈ α∗, and it holds that ∀β ∈ Ii(x) . α∗ ⊆ β.
By (hp2) we conclude α∗ 1∀ A; thus, ∃y ∈ α∗ . y 1 A.
We now show that y i x, in order to apply (hp1). Consider an arbitrary β ∈ Ii(x)
and suppose x ∈ β. Then α∗ ⊆ β and, if y ∈ α∗, y ∈ β, i.e. it holds that ∀β ∈ I(x) . x ∈
β → y ∈ β. Apply (hp1) to conclude y  A (for arbitrary y), in contraction with
∃y ∈ α∗ . y 1 A.
As for the other direction of (b+), suppose that MN  BelSafei A. Thus we have
as hypothesis that ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α and α ∀ A. We want to prove that (∀β ∈
I(x) . x ∈ β → y ∈ β) → MN , y  A. Given an arbitrary y, suppose that ∀β ∈
Ii(x) . x ∈ β → y ∈ β; we have to show that y  A. By hypothesis there is an
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α0 ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α0 and α0 ∀ A. Thus, since x ∈ α0, also y ∈ α0 (by hypothesis) and
y  A.
The notion of strong belief can be found in Stalnaker et al. (1996), where it is called
“robust belief”; in more recent years, the notion was treated by Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2002), Baltag and Smets (2008) and Pacuit (2013). According to Baltag and Smets5,
the strong belief operator can be defined in terms of knowledge and safe belief:
Bel
Strong
i A iff BeliA ∧Ki(A ⊃ BelSafei A) (∗)
Intuitively, a strong belief formula Bel
Strong
i A is saying that an agent i strongly believes
A if she believes A, and if she knows that if A is true, then she safely believes A, i.e. A
is stable under belief revision with any true information.
This condition can be expressed in terms of epistemic plausibility models. Recall
first the truth condition for the unconditional belief operator in plausibility models in
Observation 5.1: M, x  BeliA iff ∃y ∼i x . y  A and (∀z.z i y → z  A) 6. We
have:
MP , x  BelStrongi A iff (∃y.y ∼i x & (∀z . z i y → z  A))
& (∀z . z ∼i x & z  A → (∀y . y i z → y  A))
The condition can be translated in terms of neighbourhood models in an immediate way
as follows:
MN , x  BelStrongi A iff (∃α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ A) &
(∀β ∈ Ii(x)∀y ∈ β . y  A → (∃γ ∈ Ii(x).y ∈ γ & γ ∀ A))
The sequent calculus rules for both safe and strong belief can be derived from the def-
initions of the operators in terms of neighbourhood models. We factorize the complex
semantic condition for strong belief by introducing an additional operator KSafei , corre-
sponding to the second conjunct of the above denition. The modality KSafei could be
interpreted as some sort of doxastic introspection: it means that if the agent knows that
A is true, then she safely believes A. For the present scope, however, we employ this
modality as a technical device.
x : KSafei ≡ ∀b ∈ Ii(x)∀y ∈ b . y : A → (∃c ∈ Ii(x).y ∈ c & c ∀ A)
5Pacuit provides a slightly different characterization of the operator, always in terms of epistemic
plausibility models: MP , x  BelStrongi A iff (∃y . y ∼i x and y  A) and (JAK∩ [x]∼i i J¬AK∩ [x]∼i),
where for S, S′ ⊆W , let S i S′ iff ∀x ∈ S∀y ∈ S′ . x i y.
6Since the strong belief operator can be defined in terms of the other epistemic operators, we do not
explicitly extend the theorem of equivalence between models.
44
Note that the rules for strong belief introduce the simple and safe belief operators in the
premisses, in accordance with the definition of the operator.
x ∈ a, a ∈ Ii(x), a ∀ A,Γ⇒ ∆
x : BelSafei A,Γ,⇒ ∆
LSF (a fresh)
a ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : BelSafei A, a ∀ A
a ∈ Ii(x), x ∈ a,Γ⇒ ∆, x : BelSafei A
RSF
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, y : A,Γ⇒ ∆, y : BelSafei A
Γ⇒ ∆, x : KSafei A
RKSafei (y,a fresh)
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, x : KSafei A,Γ⇒ ∆, y : A a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, x : KSafei A, y : BelSafei A,Γ⇒ ∆
a ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ a, x : KSafei A,Γ⇒ ∆
LKSafei





a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, a ∀ A a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x : KSafei A
a ∈ Ii(x),Γ⇒ ∆, x : BelStrongi A
RSG
Observe that the characterisation of strong belief is guaranteed by the rules of the
calculus, since it is easy to prove that for arbitrary x the following sequents are derivable
x : Bel
Strong
i A⇒ x : BeliA ∧Ki(A ⊃ BelSafei A)
x : BeliA ∧Ki(A ⊃ BelSafei A)⇒ x : BelStrongi A
Baltag and Smets (2008) also consider the epistemic modality that expresses a strict
order on plausibility models, i.e. the following operator:
(>P ) MP , x  [>]iA iff ∀y . y <i x → y  A
In terms of neighbourhood models, the definition of the [>]i operator is the following:
(>N ) MN , x  [>]iA iff ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x /∈ α → α ∀ A
The [>]i operator is not particularly meaningful by itself; however, it can be used to
define the operator of weakly safe belief and the (more interesting) operator of unary
revision, respectively:
BelWeaki A := A ∧ [>]iA ∗i A := A ∧ [>]i¬A
Observe that x  BelWeaki A holds only if x is a minimal world with to respect to the
strict relation <i, where for minimal is meant that all smaller worlds do not satisfy A.
We will now prove the equivalence of conditions (>P ) and (>N ), thus proving the equiv-
alence of the two classes of models also with respect to this operator. The proof is an
extension of those of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3, as in the strong belief operator case.
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Proposition 6.2. The definition of the safe belief operator in preferential models, ex-
pressed by condition >P , is equivalent to the the definition of the operator in neighbour-
hood models, expressed by condition >N .
Proof. Suppose we have a plausibility model MP . We build a neighbourhood model
MN as described in the proof of Theorem 5.2. We now have to prove the following
proposition, assuming as hypothesis that JAKMN = JAKMP :
(a+ +) MN , x  [>]iA iff MP , x  [>]iA
In order to prove one direction, take as hypothesis ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x /∈ α → α ∀ A. We
want to prove that ∀y . y <i x → y  A. Suppose y <i x. Then, by construction,
x /∈↓i y, for ↓i y = {u ∈ W |u  y}. We have that ↓i y = α, for some α. By
hypothesis, α ∀ A. Then, since y ∈ α, we have that y  A.
As for the other direction, we assume as hypothesis that ∀y . y <i x → y  A, and
we want to prove that ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x /∈ α → α ∀ A. Suppose α ∈ Ii(x) and x /∈ α.
By construction, α =↓i y, for some y ∼i x, and x /∈↓i y. Thus, we have y < x. By
hypothesis, y  A. Since this holds for all y such that x /∈↓i y, and since y ∈↓i y, we
have that ↓i y ∀ A.
Suppose we have a neighbourhood model MN . We built a plausibility model MP from
it, as described in Theorem 5.3. In order to build the plausibility model, we will use the
following additional condition:
y ≺i x iff (1) ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈ α → y ∈ α
(2) ∃β ∈ Ii(x) = Ii(y) . y ∈ β and x /∈ β
We have to prove the following statement, always under the hypothesis JAKMN = JAKMP :
(b+ +) MN , x  [>]iA iff MP , x  [>]iA
To prove one direction of (b + +), suppose ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x /∈ α → α ∀ A. We want to
show that ∀y . y ≺i x → y  A. Suppose y ≺i x. This means that (1) ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x ∈
α → y ∈ α and (2) ∃β ∈ Ii(x) = Ii(y) . y ∈ β and x /∈ β. Note that the condition of
the equality of spheres in (2) is justified by the following reasoning: by total reflexivity,
y ∈ α, and by absoluteness we have Ii(x) = Ii(y). From (2), we have that there exists a
sphere β0 such that β0 ∈ Ii(x), y ∈ β0 and x /∈ β0. By hypothesis, we have that β0 ∀ A.
Thus, since y ∈ β0, y  A.
As for the other direction, assume that ∀y . y ≺i x → y  A. We want to show that
∀α ∈ Ii(x) . x /∈ α → α ∀ A. Let α ∈ Ii(x) such that x /∈ α, and let u ∈ α; we have to
show that u  A. Let Σ = {γ |u ∈ β and x /∈ γ}. Since α ∈ Σ, Σ 6= ∅. Let δ = ∩Σ; by
the strong intersection property, δ ∈ Ii(x) and δ 6= ∅.
It holds that u ∈ δ. We want to show that u ≺i x, since by hypothesis this implies
u  A. Thus, we have to prove that condition (1) and (2) hold. Condition (2) holds by
construction; as for (1), let β ∈ Ii(x) such that x ∈ β; we have to prove that also u ∈ β.
By nesting, it holds that either β ⊆ δ or δ ⊆ β. The case β ⊆ δ is not possible, since we
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have set that x ∈ β, but by construction we have that x /∈ δ. Thus, it must hold that
δ ⊆ β; since by construction u ∈ δ, we have ∈ β. Thus, by hypothesis we can conclude
u  A, and the proposition in proved.
It should be possible to extend the calculus G3CDL to cover also operators BelWeaki
and ∗i. We leave the definition of appropriate rules to the interested reader.
The following informal observation should be useful to get an idea of the motivation
behind the definition in neighbourhood models of the operators we have introduced in
this section. Let us consider a world x and the set Ii(x) of neighbourhoods associated
to it. We can split Ii(x) into two sets, namely:
Ii(x)
+ = {α ∈ Ii(x) |x ∈ α} Ii(x)− = {α ∈ Ii(x) |x /∈ α}
These represent, respectively, the set of neighbourhoods to which x belongs and the set
of neighbourhoods to which x does not belong. Now recall the four modalities which
can be defined in a standard way in neighbourhood models:7
x  ∀A iff ∀α ∈ Ii(x)(α ∀ A)
x  ∃A iff ∃α ∈ Ii(x)(α ∀ A)
x  ♦∀A iff ∀α ∈ Ii(x)(α ∃ A)
x  ♦∃A iff ∃α ∈ Ii(x)(α ∃ A)
Note that the simple belief operator x  BeliA iff ∃α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ A corresponds to the
∃ modality, while the knowledge operator x  KiA iff ∀α ∈ Ii(x) . α ∀ A corresponds
to the ∀ modality.
Furthermore, all the operators that we have taken into account in this section can
be interpreted as one of the above modalities, defined either on Ii(x)
+ or Ii(x)
−. More
precisely, the safe belief operator corresponds to the ∃ modality defined on Ii(x)+; the
strong belief operator is defined on the same set. The [>]i operator corresponds to the
∀ modality defined on Ii(x)−. The weakly safe belief operator and the unary revision
operator are defined on the same set.
This overview gives an idea of the wide variety of modal operators which is possible to
define in neighbourhood models. Following Baltag and Smets, 2008, we have restricted
our analysis to the operators that should be interesting from an epistemic viewpoint—in
principle, however, there are many others.
7 Conclusions and further research
We have proposed a semantics based on neighbourhood models, a multi-agent version of
Lewis’ sphere models, for the logic CDL of doxastic conditional beliefs. On the basis of
7Such modalities are denoted by [ ], 〈 ], [ 〉, 〈 〉 in Pacuit (2013); their proof theory is studied through
labelled sequent calculi based on neinghbourhood semantics in Negri (2017b).
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this neighbourhood semantics, we have developed a labelled sequent calculus G3CDL
for the logic, following the methodology of Negri (2005; 2017b) and Negri and Olivetti
(2015). The calculus G3CDL is analytic and enjoys cut elimination and admissibility
of the other structural rules as well as invertibility of all its rules. Moreover, on the basis
of this calculus, we obtain a decision procedure for the logic under a natural strategy
of proof search. The completeness of the calculus is proved by a finite countermodel
construction extracted from a failed or open branch of a derivation. The finite counter-
model construction provides in itself a constructive proof of the finite model property
of the logic. Finally we have shown how to extend the semantic interpretation and the
sequent calculus G3CDL to other doxastic operators, namely safe belief and strong
belief (Baltag and Smets, 2008).
There are a number of issues which may be objects of further investigation. First,
CDL is the “static” logic that underlies dynamic extensions by doxastic actions (Baltag
and Smets, 2008). It should be worth studying whether and how our calculus can be
extended to deal also with the dynamic extensions.
From a computational viewpoint, to the best of our knowledge the exact complexity
of CDL is not known. We conjecture its upper bound to be PSPACE; however, further
investigations are needed to confirm this result.
Moreover, some optimizations of the search strategy are possible, in particular to
reduce the number of labels generated in a derivation. We plan to deal with all these
topics in future research.
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